THE NEW REPUBLIC

Nuclear Pacifism

Reflections on the Community of Fear

by Robert W. Tucker

Kazakhstan and Kennedy

by Roy D. Laird

Castro's Cuba Revisited

by Samuel Shapiro

Work Ahead

The Editors

February 6, 1961, 25

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Wake Up, America!

★ The moment everybody had waited for came suddenly. The Kennedy cold wave crossed the Eisenhower tepid front. The young President took the rostrum and told Congress, "Wake up – it is later than you think!" His actual words were, "Every day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger." Just a fortnight earlier Eisenhower sent the same Congress three lullabies.

Kennedy found America tranquil; he left it – not roused, maybe – but disturbed. A nation was waking.

At 12:15 the Senators marched in, two by two. It was the great oblong hall of the House of Representatives and each addition to the audience was announced by a little man in civilian clothes looking sheepish. We do these things very poorly – nothing like the costumed ceremony of Parliament; but this scene had irresistible drama of its own even if the staging was drab. There was applause suddenly as Jacqueline Kennedy took her place in the gallery. She hesitated like a school girl, not certain it was for her, then gave a little bow that was somehow appealing.

Next – ambassadors. They came and came and came – through the swinging glass doorways in the rear; I have never seen so many; in fact some had to stand behind the guard rail. "The Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court!" cried the sheep-like usher trying to roar like a lion. Next, the Cabinet, and the big audience craned to see the new faces. All wore white carnations from the FDR memorial services. They looked younger than in their pictures. And finally the President. He spoke slowly and seemed at last to have mastered the art of reading a prepared text.

Could Kennedy be describing the same nation that Eisenhower described? It seemed incredible. Most newsmen I talked to felt stirred. Kennedy has a big asset in the friendly Washington press corps; they deplored Eisenhower and disliked Nixon.

As to the speech itself, Kennedy used shock treatment; you do not gentle a drugged man whose life is threatened. On the economic side most readers of this column have heard the story told again and again. On the military side we are in poor position to judge. On foreign affairs we particularly liked his comment on Cuba that we favor social and economic reform; it is the Communist intrusion that we oppose.

All told it was a tingling, exhilarating start. By standing and stretching forward we could see the brown head below, as he shuffled the small sheets with the large type, and tapped the lectern with the three fingers of the right hand. Kennedy gains in confidence.

Charity Isn't Enough

★ You read about distress, unemployment; maybe you say to yourself, "I ought to help!" You consider $100 for charity – end up, perhaps, sending $25. Your conscience hurts but you have done something. Unemployment now is 5.5 million, or 7 percent; the December figure was the highest in 20 years; 100 communities are chronically distressed. (If you're tenderhearted don't read how the unemployed live!)

Now approach it another way. Continued slumps and sluggish recoveries – another way of saying slow economic growth – hold America back. There have been four postwar recessions; after each the rate of unemployment has stabilized *at a higher point*. Under Eisenhower national growth was 10 percent below the "norm." If we could only have reached that norm (3 percent expansion in a year) we would have another $50 billion this year in national product. Compare your donation of $25 with $50 billions; it is laughable! The gift was fine, of course, but this isn't charity, it's economics. Something is wrong with our economy. What is it? Is labor slacking? Hardly! Productivity per worker has gone up. The nation is producing what it did three years ago with 19 percent fewer workers; their productivity has increased. The fact is that recoveries have been sluggish, anemic. Kennedy has two problems: prevent the immediate slump from snowballing into something worse, cure the overall anemia.

What causes this? Well, part of the trouble is faulty distribution of income. Some of the people who produce the goods don't have the money to buy them. A more basic explanation comes from Harvard's Alvin Hansen in his just published book, *Economic Issues of the 1960's*. Under advertising stimulus, he says, we are squandering our productive capacity on artificially created wants (tail fins, bath salts) that have little or no inherent value. We have reached the point where enormous uninhibited private spending, plus necessary federal outlays for defense, are starving public investment in research, education, housing, resource development and the like. Our plant is deteriorating (example: our cities) because of inadequate public investment. Solution? More wise public spending. "An optimum rate of growth cannot be reached," says Hansen, "without a change in social values which will permit a better use of our productive resources."

Here and There

★ Kennedy people quickly shushed a saber-rattling speech by Admiral Arleigh Burke; US is the only big nation in the world which allows its armed forces such latitude in policy statements . . . If only Kennedy will now curb J. Edgar Hoover, repeated supporter of the House Un-American Activities Committee! . . . With Hoover's indorsement, the Committee is pushing its doctored propaganda film *Operation Abolition*, claiming student riots in San Francisco last May were all a Communist plot . . . Laos is an example of lavishing US economic aid on backward countries where the generals and landlords get the gain; American investments made Cuba "rich" – that is all but about 70 percent of the people.

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The up-and-at-'em spirit of the President's State of the Union message has done more than momentarily envigorate our sluggish national reflexes. It has signalled the start of a disciplined exercise of leadership on a multitude of challenging fronts. Nowhere is that plainer than in Mr. Kennedy's comments on the economy. "Economic prophecy," he said, "is at best an uncertain art – as demonstrated by the prediction one year ago from this podium that 1960 would be 'the most prosperous year in our history'. Nevertheless, forecasts of continued slack and only slightly reduced unemployment throughout 1961 and 1962 have been made with alarming unanimity – and this Administration does not intend to stand helplessly by."

The cause for alarm – and for the unanimity – is visible. Between November and December, those out of work increased by half a million, three times the normal figure. Today they number 5.5 million. Of these, more than one million – 200,000 more than a year ago – have been without jobs for at least 15 weeks; about half have been unemployed for more than six months. So in a civilian labor force of 70.5 million, nearly 7 percent are jobless, and their ranks are expected to increase during February, normally the worst month of the year because of the shutdown of outdoor work. Such a rise would carry unemployment past the 7.5 percent cited as critical in the task force report to President Kennedy prepared under the chairmanship of Professor Samuelson. And it is married men with families who have been the victims too of the rise in joblessness this past year; their December unemployment rate was 5.1 percent. Now, as Seymour Wolfbein of the US Department of Labor has said: "Unemployment is reaching the stable core of the work force, no longer just the marginal workers."

This is the reality so long blurred by rhetoric about our "unparalleled prosperity" and which comes to many as a shock.

While unemployment has grown, employment has been declining – non-agricultural employment has been on the downgrade since June – with contractions in practically all of the 21 major industries, led by apparel, autos and electrical machinery. With 66 million employed, the job supply is just about what it was a year ago – and the available work force has increased over the year by about 900,000. (This coming June, when the first wave of war babies gets out of high school, 1.2 million new job-seekers will enter the labor force.) Moreover, some 1.5 million of those who have jobs are working short weeks because of slack times – 300,000 more than a year ago. In December,

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the average work week dropped almost half an hour, to 38.8 hours. And this slack is apt to be taken up before anyone new is hired or put back on the payroll.

What can the new Administration do about it?

Executive Order No. 1, issued by President Kennedy, has already begun to help relieve hardship through enlarged distribution of surplus foods. But as the President has said, legislation is required to provide money to the states to extend the length of time over which unemployment compensation will be paid, thereby directly aiding workers who have exhausted their benefits, and aiding states that have exhausted their funds.

The Samuelson report urges not only emergency help to states, enabling them to pay benefits up to 39 weeks, regardless of the condition of their reserves or of the loans they may have made in 1958; it calls for greater equality among the laws of the several states and for the setting up of federal standards. These might require participating states to pay benefits equal to half the earnings of the unemployed worker, with a possible duration of 26 weeks, plus an additional 13 weeks in times of general national unemployment, and to finance their funds under tax schedules adequate to insure solvency. In addition, the task force advises the introduction of flexible provisions which would tie benefits to the general level of national unemployment.

But what the unemployed individual most wants is not relief, but pay for work. To be effective, anti-recession measures must reverse the current failure of consumer demand.

One of the two levers normally first used to stimulate economic activity – the use of monetary policy to increase the money supply by reducing reserve requirements – is currently all but blocked by the deficit in our balance of payment, which, as the President noted, "increased by nearly $11 billion in the last three years [since 1958]." Use of the other lever, however – the use of fiscal policy to lighten the tax burden – is given high priority by most economists and was suggested by Mr. Kennedy in the course of the campaign. The Samuelson study recommends a temporary, across-the-board tax cut of three-to-four points, to be initiated in March or April if unemployment reaches 7.5 percent, and to run to the end of the year, with possible discretionary authority given to the President to extend the moratorium through 1962 if conditions require it. In addition, the President proposes boosting consumer income "by raising and expanding the minimum wage."

Stimulation of the economy through government expenditures is the third accessible lever. Here the task force, believing that this recession is a sag rather than a drop, advises against hasty action. And Mr. Kennedy has added that "barring the development of urgent national defense needs or a worsening economy, it is my earnest intention to advocate a program of expenditures which, including revenues from a stimulation of the economy, will not of and by themselves, unbalance the earlier [Eisenhower] budget." Actually, in the civilian sector of schools and highways and in the defense sector of weapons, enough projects are past the planning stage to make acceleration of actual production unusually easy. Noted by the task force as desirable *on their merits* are a wider range of welfare and national security projects that would require an estimated $3-$5 billion in governmental expenditures over and above what had previously been planned for fiscal year 1962.

In addition to such stimulants, the task force offers two special proposals in the area of money and credit. The range between long- and short-term interest rates could be lessened; also, residential housing starts could be stimulated by lengthening the amortization period, by reducing the FHA insurance fee from 1/2 to 1/4 percent, by increasing Fanny May purchases of mortgages on housing for the elderly, for urban renewal and for college dormitories.

And finally, so that growth may be sustained once it is resumed, the report suggests an effort, short of government direction, to relate wages, prices and productivity sufficiently to control the price creep which has been a regular concomitant of full employment.

"We will do what must be done," Mr. Kennedy says. We will, if the public wills it, and, willing it, conveys that thought to the 87th Congress.

Old Public Servants

Some snowy evening, readers looking for entertainment may wish to review recent Republican campaign speeches that throbbed with anxiety lest the country's management be entrusted to inexperience, and then glance over the list of President Kennedy's appointees throughout the second-level of the federal bureaucracy.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the latest recruit to the White House staff, has never, for example, been content to sit in Cambridge and write books. He had been an energetic participant in public affairs before anyone knew whether General Eisenhower was a Republican or a Democrat. At State, the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, George Ball, a Washington lawyer with an international practice, has not only been in the thick of various efforts to promote European unity, but in the thick of politics since the first Stevenson campaign. The Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, Chester Bowles, had diplomatic, gubernatorial and Congressional experience after directing the OPA at the time of Korea. Roger Jones, Assistant Secretary for Administration, has been in government for 28 years.

At Treasury, Under-Secretary Henry H. Fowler has been in and out of the bureaucracy since the earliest days of the Foreign Economic Administration, and has currently been serving on a commission to study the

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fiscal problems with which he will now deal. The Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs, Mr. Robert V. Roosa, when asked by the Senate Finance Committee if he approved the tight money policy, replied that as an official of the New York Federal Reserve Bank he helped make it.

At Defense, Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric was previously Under-Secretary of the Air Force; Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze, in addition to earlier employment at the Pentagon, ran the policy planning staff at State and headed the private Foreign Service Educational Foundation in Washington.

At Justice, Deputy Attorney General Byron W. White was not only a successful lawyer and Kennedy campaigner, but an unsuccessful candidate for Congress; and one new Assistant Attorney-General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach (Rhodes Scholar, Professor of Law at Yale and at Chicago) did a tour of duty with the Secretary of the Air Force some years back.

At Interior, Under-Secretary James K. Carr was chairman of the California Water Commission.

At the Post Office, Under-Secretary H. W. Brawley has been executive director of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

At Agriculture, Under-Secretary Charles Murphy was administrative assistant and later general counsel to President Truman.

At Commerce, Under-Secretary for International Affairs Rowland Burstan is back in the department where he worked as an economist and assistant editor of the *Survey of Current Business* 30 years ago.

At Labor, Under-Secretary W. Willard Wirtz was general counsel of the War Labor Board, chairman of the postwar National Wage Stabilization Board, and an important aide to Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956.

At HEW, Under-Secretary Ivan A. Nestingen was the mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, and one of the original backers of the "Joe Must Go" campaign.

For the first time in remembered history, the formation of an incoming Administration resembles the formation of a new government under the parliamentary system of England and France; many of the incoming officials are already known to each other, most have had some previous governmental experience.

Bankrupt Reaction

Every so often, TV redeems all those dreary hours. *CBS Reports* performed a service of enduring worth on January 19 in exhibiting the person and views of Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the House Rules Committee and the best-placed and most powerful exponent of reaction in national politics. One part of the program dealt with arguments about the position of the Rules Committee in the House, and as to that, "Judge" Smith, as he is called, shrewdly and comfortably made the few points that are to be made in behalf of oligarchy. The overwhelming case the other way came crisply from Rep. Richard Bolling of Missouri, no less effectively than it did later from Kennedy himself.

Howard K. Smith of CBS, who was doing the interviewing, questioned, however, not only the administrative justification of the powers wielded by Chairman Smith, but also the policy ends he strives to achieve. And here, as Representative Smith talked in the same accents and with the same mannerisms, the image of the pleasant, shrewd, comfortable tactician fell away and in its stead appeared the face of unmitigated intellectual bankruptcy. All that Congressman Smith can bring to bear on the issues of his day is an impregnable resistance to the actualities of the human condition in his time; a substitution for ideas of a mixture of romanticism and cynicism which is much more disagreeable than either alone; and an ultimate shrugging declination to submit to the test of argument.

The Supreme Court, the Congressman thinks, should not declare the law of the land as it did in the segregation case; it was not meant to do so by the Constitution. But it has done so for 160 years, very often, no doubt, with Mr. Smith's approval. No matter. Negro voting rights insured by federal legislation? A transgression on the rights of the states, since the Constitution leaves it to the states to fix eligibility to vote. But the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination in the discharge of this state function. "I just don't agree with it. . . ." Integration? "I don't agree at all that the Negro people, the vast bulk of them, want to go into white schools. . . . In recent years, they've got better schools than the white children have in my county." Economic regulation? "I've always taken the position that it was just as unconstitutional to fix a minimum wage as it would be to fix a maximum wage." Aid to education? "Now, we're doing mighty good on public education. . . . [and] you'd better not rock the old boat too much with controversy." And so forth, and so on. All most edifying.

Talking Out of Turn

"The talkativeness of American military men, most of them reading speeches written by professional speech writers who are paid by the government, is an international scandal," Walter Lippmann observed during the waning days of the Eisenhower Administration. The scandal has ended. The new Administration has ordered stiff enforcement of regulations controlling public statements by Generals and Admirals.

Word was let out that a draft of a speech to be made by Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, had "appalled" the White House and the State

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Department and that a complete rewriting had been ordered. Arthur Sylvester, the respected former Washington correspondent of the *Newark News* and now Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, told why: the draft had "dealt with matters of foreign policy in sensitive areas at a time of transition from one Administration to another and concerned policies on which the President and Secretary of State should be spokesmen."

Civilian supremacy is not a recondite constitutional principle. It is mainly a practical matter of self-confidence on the part of high civil authority, and apparently the leadership has an ample portion of that attribute. The notion of reserving certain areas of official discourse to the President and the Secretary of State is astoundingly simple and eminently valid. Applying it requires preventing every top official from being his own trial balloonist in foreign affairs. But it should apply not merely to the military. Every official personage might well heed the point that no constitutional requirement compels an elaborate answer to every question, even one put at a press conference, and that no one will think less of an official who wisely refrains from commenting, without warrant, on sensitive and important issues.

For example, Adlai Stevenson was asked, at his first press conference as our chief representative at the United Nations, whether the President would welcome informal contact with the Soviet Premier in event of the latter's attendance at the to-be-resumed session of the 15th General Assembly. It was the same question that had been put to the President earlier in the week, and had been amply but guardedly answered by him.

Mr. Stevenson began well: "I cannot speak for the President on this matter . . . ," thus coming to a fine stopping place. But he continued: ". . . because I have not discussed it with him . . .," again reaching a good point at which to quit. Then he shifted direction: ". . . . but my guess is that he would be happy to meet Mr. Khrushchev here."

Why a guess on such a matter? Later in the day the White House issued a statement putting matters in proportion: Mr. Stevenson had been expressing only his personal views, and presumably not at the President's request.

Turning on the Defroster

Clearly a new beginning has been made in the attempt to work toward an easier and more productive relationship with the Soviet Union. This is what Premier Khrushchev said he wanted and looked forward to with the advent of the new Administration. President Kennedy reciprocated in a dignified way in his first two addresses. The US Government was not so anxi-

Long Trek

ous to please that it would suffer itself to be crowded into an early Summit meeting, but quiet conversations were resumed. The dangerous virtual hiatus in diplomatic relations which has obtained since May was corrected. The Soviet Government, with its usual sharp opportunism, then released the two RB-47 pilots – an action it had saved for the moment of maximum effect, when it could earn credit for a gesture of conciliation to a new team rather than appearing to give in to the demands of the old. And the President, himself no man to miss opportunities, announced the release personally over national television, telephoned the families of the flyers, and then met them personally on their return.

For the time being, at least, the watchword is civility – the expression employed to describe the attitude we would seek in handling difficult and dangerous problems with the exterior world. It is an apt word. It implies surcease from the fulminating and recrimination characteristic of the past decade. It is the attitude of men who must live in proximity, in contact, yet with well understood rights. It is similar to politeness, polish, political – and also to urbanity – all derived from a word meaning city. Presumably our government will no longer feel compelled to trade jab for jab, blast for blast, even if and when the Soviet regime again forgets its manners. This is good, for under the old manners, exemplified by Henry Cabot Lodge's profitless practice of insistently rebutting every Soviet absurdity, US prestige suffered more than it gained. Civility eschews

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sentimentality just as it avoids edginess, withholding chumminess just as it withholds spleen.

East and West can scarcely be said to have got down to negotiating. So far they are only making soundings. But they are in the preliminary of preliminaries.

Faint Flashes from the East

At a moment when goodwill signals carrying the word "cooperation" are being flashed from both Washington and Moscow, any message, however faint, is worth picking up. Keen listeners may find it worth tuning in to the Soviet Orthodox Patriarchate.

Hitherto, the notion of closer union between the Eastern and the Western churches has been anathema to Moscow. By *Pravda's* standards, the Vatican wants to build an ecclesiastical NATO, and colonialists wear cassocks as often as any other disguise. Thus when an Ilyushin aircraft-full of Soviet bishops touched down in Egypt recently, just as the Archbishop of Canterbury was finishing up in Rome, it was legitimate to assume that their visit was intended as a counterweight. But the timing of the two tours seems to have been accidental. Nevertheless, the pronouncements of the Soviet divines while in the United Arab Republic suggested plain political purpose.

So long as they were visiting in neutralist countries – that is, with the Orthodox patriarchs of Alexandria in Egypt and Antioch in Syria – they stressed how much closer the various branches of the Orthodox church were to one another than to any outside Christian body. (This, of course, is a truism, but does not prevent an ecumenical spirit from flourishing among many of the Eastern orthodox churches outside Russia.) When they mentioned Rome, they referred to relations with it as possible only as between "equal partners" – a proposition which presents difficulties.

But the excursion of the Soviet Bishops did not end in the UAR. At Russian request, it continued onto much more unfamiliar ground – to Istanbul and Athens. The Oecumenical Patriarch of Istanbul, Athenagoras, (whose previous visitor had been Britain's Archbishop of Canterbury) makes no secret of his view that Christian Union is a positive Christian move and not a negative anti-Communist one, while Archbishop Theoklitos, primate of Greece, has long shown mistrust of Moscow, and has so far evaded accepting invitations to visit it. In Turkey (where the Soviet delegation spent Christmas officiating in conditions of brotherhood that had not been practiced since the 16th Century) the chief Soviet spokesman remained wary: "We do not intend to unite with any church or religion which is not orthodox." At Athens, however, he went farther, and made a surprising reference to rapprochement between the Orthodox churches of the East and of the West. The composition of the delegation was interesting. At its head was Alexis, the 83-year-old Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Until a few months before, he had been advised on foreign affairs by the Metropolitan Nicolas, a great theologian but, since his release from prison in 1927, an acquiescent Party man. Last year, Metropolitan Nicolas was retired "for health reasons" and he died this January. But before his death he had been replaced by two much younger men, the more remarkable and voluble of whom, Bishop Nikodim of Podolsk, is only 31. This very juvenile member of the new generation of leaders has lately been to Britain as well as to the Middle East and is obviously being groomed for an international role.

Maybe the change of emphasis in Athens had no significance. Certainly the Greek Communist press had had no change of directive, for it continued to plug the anti-Vatican line. And *Pravda*, almost simultaneously, was attacking the Vatican's "outbranching well-schooled staff" as the bulwark of colonialism and "the worst enemy of the peoples of the East and Africa." But if, as is possible, the Soviet bishops have been given guidance a little different from that handed by the Party to popular newspapers, any fresh handsignals from patriarchs are worth watching for.

Toward Peace in Algeria

As was expected, the public vote of confidence for President de Gaulle's Algerian program has greatly brightened the prospects for peace in North Africa. The French Government has made clear its willingness to talk directly with the FLN nationalists, while the latter, although critical of the referendum, have conceded that, "The Algerian problem has entered a new phase which makes it feasible to foresee the possibility of a peaceful and negotiated solution."

Several very prickly nettles still need to be grasped, of course, before peace is assured. The FLN Provisional Government, according to its communiqué of January 16, is firmly opposed to "the vain attempts of the French Government to install an 'executive' in our country, thus repeating the Bao-Dai experience." It is also apprehensive about the role of the French Army during the period between cease-fire and the holding of the referendum on Algerian self-determination. Nevertheless, it has indicated a willingness to compromise on both points – to accept, for example, the formation of local administrative bodies, and to insist on the withdrawal of only the professional NATO forces, while permitting conscript troops to remain in order to protect *colon* life and property. De Gaulle, for his part, has done nothing to push the creation of an Algerian "executive" organ, and he will probably proceed with all deference to Algerian sensitivities so long as the

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FLN seems sincerely anxious to reach a settlement.

With the French and Algerians apparently ready to begin a meaningful dialogue, it might seem that there is nothing for the United States to do except cheer on the forces of moderation in both camps. However, even if peace is achieved, and the "anti-colonialism versus NATO commitments" dilemma is no longer there to harass us, we shall still have cause to be concerned. The FLN has announced its determination to create not only a new nation, but a new society. To do so in this war-ravaged land will require huge amounts of foreign assistance. Will it be assumed that France alone will be able to supply the bulk of this aid, or will the US also be prepared to participate in some sort of multilateral development program? If snags develop over the control or exploitation of the Saharan oil and natural gas resources, will Washington be able to offer compromise plans? There is also the possibility, albeit remote, of a split within the FLN or of a Communist attempt to gain control of the insurgent organization. If either situation should develop, does our government stand idly by, or will it be ready to assist the faction most interested in the welfare of the Algerian people? The search for answers to such questions should begin now, if we are not to taste the bitter fruits reaped by lack of foresight in other parts of Africa.

Arrest in Asuncion

Information has reached several American campuses that Luis Alfonso Rusk, Vice President of the Paraguayan National Students' Union, was arrested shortly after his return from a speaking tour in Europe and the United States. Ordinary prisoners in Paraguay are usually put to work on farms or factories owned by important government officials; outspoken critics of the Stroessner dictatorship like Señor Rusk are liable to be "shot while attempting to escape," or found floating down the Paraná River with their heads missing. Given the shaky diplomatic and economic foundations of his regime, General Stroessner is not likely to be any more gentle with his opponents than he has been in the past.

During the six years since Stroessner seized power, the US has made no effort to use its considerable influence in Paraguay to bring about a modification of his arbitrary rule. Harry F. Stimpson, Jr., the American ambassador in Asunción, has repeatedly stated that he considers the existing state of siege and the murder of political prisoners "internal affairs," with which he can have nothing to do. Meanwhile the dictatorship, which spends 45 percent of its budget on armaments, receives regular assistance from the US (most recently an $11 million loan from the International Monetary Fund). Stroessner's propagandists take the credit for obtaining such US-financed public works as the new jet runway in Asunción, and the paving of the highway that runs to the Brazilian border, and the State Department last year, acting on a "special request" from the dictator, refused to grant an entry permit to an aide of Ramón Talavera, the Roman Catholic priest who is the leader of the democratic opposition in Paraguay. These favors to the last dictator in South America have turned many of the half-million Paraguayan exiles (one quarter of the population) against the US; the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Buenos Aires and Montevideo make sure that the point is driven home.

It may by now be too late to save Señor Rusk from torture and death at the hands of his captors. But a vigorous protest on his behalf by the new Secretary of State might perhaps save his life, and would in any event furnish tangible proof of that renewed sympathy with the forces of democratic reform which President Kennedy promised in his press conference last week.

Santa Maria

The stringent punishments prescribed against piracy and the long established practice of making the offense subject to the authority of any government in position to exercise it arise from reason and practical circumstances. Any ship of commerce plying the sea is inherently and enormously vulnerable to predatory and violent acts. All nations have an interest in ensuring that such acts be inhibited by a high probability of immediate retribution.

One can understand the desperate hope which led to the taking over of the Portuguese liner *Santa Maria* by force at sea and feel some degree of sympathy with the expressed revolutionary purposes of those who did it, as well as some regret over the probable futility of their action. Yet, according to uncontroverted reports, they did descend upon a ship engaged in innocent commerce, did take it over by violence, did kill an officer at his duty on the bridge, and did exercise duress over passengers and crew – no small list of offenses against the universally-accepted laws of the sea.

The plea of insurgency and, accordingly, of some sort of belligerent rights scarcely washes. The taking over of a ship may be justified by belligerency. Justifying a claim of belligerency by taking over a ship is another matter entirely. One may disapprove of the regime of Dr. Salazar in Portugal and still object to the apparent disposition of our State Department to establish a negotiating position *vis-à-vis* the anti-Salazar predators. On this issue of piracy, what would our attitude be if someday, somewhere, a ship under the American flag were to be taken over in the name of a plot to overthrow the US Government, and other governments with power immediately at hand talked and temporized and permitted the situation to drag on?

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A Lift for the Gifted

It has taken nearly two centuries for us to realize the Founding Fathers' dreams of a national university which would bring together the most talented members of each generation and offer them the best possible schooling. Today, of course, we have not one but several dozen such institutions, and their number is steadily growing as national scholarships become more accessible, and the possibility of going somewhere other than the local community college dawns on more and more high school students.

But at the secondary school level such progress has been less noticeable. A handful of New England boarding schools have managed to attract students from outside the Seaboard upper classes; the quality of their instruction, like the aptitudes of the students, has been far above national norms. Still, the great majority of Americans have never heard of these schools, much less considered them as places where the defects of their own local school systems might be remedied. How many Southern Negroes, deprived of an adequate education in their home town, even imagine applying to Andover for a scholarship? (And how many would Andover admit?). How many bright farm boys in Maine or Wyoming, confronted with a school whose graduating class of 30 boys provides them not a single intellectual companion, know enough about Exeter to realize that it might be more congenial and exciting? Almost none, as admissions officers in these schools sadly testify.

The relative obscurity of even those private boarding schools which draw from a wide geographic area has lessened their value in another way. A university such as Harvard or Yale offers a national yardstick of what faculty remuneration and academic freedom can mean, just as a college like Reed illustrates what undergraduate education can achieve. But while the professor at the University of Indiana or San Jose State College can profit by looking at these "national" institutions, the teacher in Bloomington or San Jose schools cannot gain similar ideas or hopes from the example of Groton or Lawrenceville, for he will hardly ever have heard of them. Harvard's experiments with the elective system and General Education have been both a model and a warning to the whole country. But Exeter's ventures in discussion instruction and accelerated curricula have neither encouraged the ambitious nor discouraged the utopian, for they remain relatively unknown.

At a time when it is still difficult to persuade the federal government to provide adequate scholarships for needy *college* students, it may be hopeless to urge the merits of similar financial assistance to deserving secondary school pupils. Yet such aid is, if anything, more important, for the really talented and ambitious college applicant can usually find money to finance whatever education he wants and deserves, while the secondary school student is still stuck with his local high school. If those who fear that federal aid and control of education will lead to homogenization of our schools are really serious, then there could be no better way to avoid the danger than to provide students with a real choice as to where they will get their secondary as well as their higher education.

A private secondary school system as healthy as private colleges seems threatening to some, especially some in the public schools. But at least we might establish some criteria for determining when a local public school was hopelessly inadequate for a particular student (as when it does not offer the courses he needs for admission to the college of his choice, or when it denies him the right to go to school with white as well as black classmates). School boards which failed to meet these minimal standards might be required to provide their victims with an alternative. Or better, the Congress of the United States might do so.

A less likely but perhaps more immediately fruitful alternative would be the creation of perhaps a dozen free national boarding schools to serve any gifted student who could qualify for admission. Such schools, properly financed, could also serve as national models of what secondary school teaching and remuneration should be, and could become nationally visible laboratories for educational experimentation. The difficulty would be in choosing students for admission, but perhaps this could be solved by financing the school in part on loans. If every student were required to pledge, say, the payment of 10 percent of his future income taxes to the school, the number of applicants might fall off precipitously, but so would the cost of the school to the taxpayer. Obviously current inability to pay for a good education should be no obstacle to getting it, but reluctance to pay for it in the future when the money is available may be as good an indication as any of inability to profit from the best that education can offer.

From Jail to Power

The cases of the Congo's Patrice Lumumba and Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta offer new proof that the least likely way to quash a political legend is by imprisonment. On the contrary, a prison cell offers the political figure whose chief stock in trade is mystique all the props for martyrdom, as well as insulation against the wear-and-tear of decision-making.

Mr. Lumumba was in deep political trouble with his over-expectant followers when President Kasavubu first deposed and subsequently imprisoned him in the latter months of 1960, thus removing him from all

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"Wonder Who's Rising to the Top Today?"

responsibility and assuring his symbolic position. The beatings by his captors and his reported mesmerization of the troops who guarded him at Thysville have only added to his fame. By last week, the name Lumumba had become a rallying point for militant nationalists all over Africa, forces acting in his name appeared to be politically dominant in nearly half of the Congo, and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold had publicly confirmed that a realistic political settlement would be impossible in the Congo without Lumumba's participation. Sitting quietly in his prison cell watching his legend grow, Lumumba does not have to commit himself on any controversial issue and thus can be all things to all man.

Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, who was arrested in 1952 on charges of organizing Mau Mau, has been out of political circulation for more than eight years – six of them in prison, the last two in enforced "rustication" in Kenya's remote Northern Province. In these years, he has never made a public political announcement and has had only indirect contact with Kenya's active political leaders. Yet, with Kenya's first general election under its new constitution due in February, leaders of every political persuasion in both major parties are hailing him as the father of Kenya nationalism and the only possible candidate for first Chief Minister of an African government. Nobody, not even the African politicians who clamor loudest for his release, really knows what Kenyatta stands for in the completely changed political context of 1961. But two things are certain: it would be political suicide for any Kenya politician to question his predominance, and the need for a supra-tribal "father figure" capable of welding the bevy of competing prima-donnas in Kenya politics into a cohesive force is real.

The British Government – which is on record with the most damning condemnations of Kenyatta for his alleged role in Mau Mau (a role which Africans charge is greatly exaggerated) – reportedly is now resigned to the inevitability of his release, being undecided only about the timing. Like some of the African pragmatists who clamor for Kenyatta's return to active political life without really being affected by his charisma, the British now appear to be convinced that the only possible way to deal with the Kenyatta myth is to bring the man out of the shadows into the bright Kenya sunshine. For good or ill, it appears almost certain that Kenyatta will emerge to center stage before very many weeks have passed. As one British critic wryly put it, "We have not only built Kenyatta into a powerful political legend by protecting him from responsibility for eight years but we have even cured him of near-alcoholism so he can better get on with the job of throwing us out."

Ben-Gurion Returns

Ben-Gurion has done it again, as Israel's *der alte* has many times, getting his way by resigning or threatening to do so. In this instance, taking a vacation to "consider his resignation" sufficed. Last week, the executive body of *Mapai* (Labor Party), the central force of Israeli politics, supported Ben-Gurion in his five-year-old fight against former Defense Minister Lavon. The vote in the coalition cabinet in which *Mapai* has an absolute majority, was 10 to 2 in favor of the Premier.

The Lavon affair has been as mysterious as it has been long. It started in February, 1955, when Israeli agents in Cairo were ordered to carry out spying and sabotage activities, whose true nature was never revealed. The agents were caught before they had accomplished their mission, due to a mishap. An investigation to determine the person responsible for the failure fixed blame on Lavon, then Defense Minister. He denied responsibility but nevertheless was forced to resign and then become Secretary-General of the powerful labor union federation, the *Histadrut*.

In November, 1960, an army officer, confessing to other crimes, revealed that Lavon's condemnation in 1956 was based on the use of a forged letter, in which the words, "by the order of Lavon were added. A new top-level investigation thereupon absolved Lavon; the

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Israeli Chief-of-Staff resigned; and Ben-Gurion went on his "vacation" to protest acceptance of the report of the absolving committee.

The Premier's intransigence has several sources: Lavon violated the political rules of the game by a bitter personal and public fight for vindication; and in the process he questioned the integrity of two institutions which are almost holy in Israel: the army and Ben-Gurion himself. The Premier is also reported to believe that Lavon did give the order that led to the failure of the mission, orally, under "four eyes." But none of these points is as significant as the succession struggle that is intertwined with Lavon's fate.

Ben-Gurion is 74 and not in the best of health. He is grooming two successors. First in line is M. Dayan, ex-Chief-of-Staff, now Minister of Agriculture. The other is S. Peres, who is already understudying for his future post in his role as Deputy Defense Minister. Until his forced resignation, Lavon, too, was a leading candidate. This is more than a question of personalities. Dayan, 44, and Peres, 40, belong to the new generation. They represent the army officers, young administrators in the various state agencies, and the young Israeli professionals and intellectuals. Lavon, 56, is the symbol of the older generation – the immigrants from East Europe, the politicians who came up through the labor union and the party machinery. Thus, while the Lavon affair might tentatively have been concluded, the succession fight continues. Only after Ben-Gurion's retirement will it become clear whether a representative of the younger generation, or of the old timers, or some "compromise" candidate will inherit his responsibilities.

WHAT THE GERMANS EXPECT OF THE NEW PRESIDENT

Satisfaction on the Rhine

Bonn

The President's Inaugural speech had an overwhelmingly favorable reception here. The three principal political parties all declared that Mr. Kennedy would give a new sense of initiative and purpose to Western policies in Europe and elsewhere. Dr. Adenauer complimented the President warmly and assured him of solid West German diplomatic support. The Social Democratic Lord Mayor of West Berlin, Herr Willy Brandt, praised the President's "firmness and clarity," his devotion to the cause of freedom and his readiness to negotiate with the Soviet without fear or undue haste.

The press was equally unstinting with its approval. The Christian Democratic *Rheinische Post* placed its reliance in the new President primarily because of his energy and his awareness of the difficulties ahead. The liberal *Frankfurter Rundschau* chiefly valued his fighting spirit. The independent *Cologne Stadtanzeiger* pinned its hopes on his inventiveness and his rejection of purely negative anti-Communism. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, possibly the most discerning newspaper in Germany today, was delighted with the new "team" in Washington which it regarded as an ideal blending of men of ideas and men of experience.

But in spite of the fanfare, nobody expects Mr. Kennedy to work miracles. Dr. Adenauer anticipates that it will take the President time to formulate his European policies, and so is postponing his visit to Washington until May. There have been plenty of warning voices, telling Germans not to expect too much, too soon, and however pleased most Germans are to see a younger, more active man than Eisenhower at the helm in Washington, there is a feeling that Kennedy may place a little too much power into the hands of younger men. Here is more than a hint of the German hope for "continuity" of American policies, expressed so often during the Presidential election campaign and leading to a slight but discernible bias in favor of Nixon.

There are four things in particular which most Germans will expect of President Kennedy.

The first is the maintenance of the freedom and independence of West Berlin, possibly by merely displaying firmness and energy, possibly by producing novel and constructive ideas. But Germans know well enough how difficult the latter would be, and there is little disposition to look beyond the *status quo*. The only new thought which has been gently aired in the West German press is that the Western Powers might be able to secure the integrity of Berlin by recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier. Probably three out of every four people in Western Germany would regard this as a fair exchange.

Most Germans will also expect the President to make a coherent effort to convince Khrushchev that it is in the long-term Soviet interest to have a friendly, unified

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and grateful Germany in the heart of Europe. Adenauer evidently expects the President to make this effort; he has prepared the way to some extent by exchanging a series of polite, almost friendly communications with Khrushchev and by passing the word to the West German press that he sees no reason why a more fruitful era of Russo-German relations should not be beginning.

In the third place, most West Germans will expect the President to carry out his own reassessment of the tasks of NATO and to examine possibilities of overhauling its organization. The government parties have always argued that giving NATO more of a bite in no way prevents efforts to obtain general, controlled disarmament or to reduce tension in Central Europe. *Adenauer is profoundly convinced that disarmament* prospects are actually improved as NATO becomes politically more self-aware and militarily more efficient. The main purpose of his proposed visit to Washington is probably to convince Mr. Kennedy this is so.

Finally, West Germans want an outlet for their super-abundant energies. They do not want such an outlet in the political field, for they are still cognizant of the distrust which German political activity causes in both Britain and France. It is otherwise in the economic field. Here, the two most important men in Western Germany are Professor Erhard, the Federal Minister of Economics, and Herr Berg, the President of the West German Federation of Industry. Both want carefully-planned international cooperation in providing aid for the developing countries. Although the West German government has produced its own plan for an aid program in 1961 of between 3,500 and 4,000 million marks ($840 to $852 million), it did so with much misgiving. An all-embracing Western effort, Professor Erhard believes, will reduce waste and time spent on inquiries.

Adenauer will not want to be regarded as a potential stumbling-block to President Kennedy's plans for "making a fresh start" in trying to solve East-West differences. He has encouraged the West German Ambassador in Moscow to engender an atmosphere of conciliation. He has himself been almost effusively friendly to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn before the latter left after Christmas to report to his government. He threw out the suggestion that the Federal Republic might seek closer relations with Poland. Clearly, the Chancellor has become worried by the reputation he has earned in some quarters of being an obstructive, obstinate old man.

There is one final reflection on how President Kennedy may contribute toward a solution of Germany's problems. It is by instilling a greater spirit of self-confidence in the West Germans. This self-confidence is lacking, as was shown when the President of the East German *Volkskammer* came to Marburg at the beginning of January, and the political parties failed to make clear to him that 52 million West Germans will never desert their 16 million East German brethren and will never rest until they have been given their political freedom. Self-confidence will only be gained if Western policies are flexible as well as firm, and if Khrushchev is regarded less as an ogre and more as a bedeviled ruler with a great many worrying problems of his own.

TERENCE PRITTIE

Kazakhstan, Khrushchev and Kennedy

Mr. Khrushchev's sweeping reorganization last week of supply and distribution in Soviet agriculture as a result of lagging farm output surprised some Americans who, impressed by the great land mass of the Soviet Union, are not aware that the area suitable for crops is not significantly greater than that of the United States. Climatically, the USSR is more comparable to Canada than it is to our country. And yet, natural disadvantages do not entirely explain the seriously low agricultural yields and poor labor productivity in the USSR. To understand that, we need to review some history.

Stalin was so deeply committed to rapidly expanding Soviet industrial potential (and maximum central controls) that he was unable to contrive ways of alleviating agricultural deficiencies. No wonder Khrushchev made his name in 1950 by suggesting a panacea for farming, by which the already large farms were amalgamated into even larger (and assertedly better) collectives. From that time forward he used first one and then another promised formula for increasing food production as his major weapon in the campaign to succeed Stalin. With one or two exceptions, the whole of Khrushchev's major domestic concern has been concentrated on farming.

Among his schemes has been the widespread introduction of corn (he jokingly admits to being called "Kukarusa," Russian for corn). He ordered the end of the state's direct management of field work through the disbanding of the Machine Tractor Stations. Similarly, in 1954 he vigorously promoted putting millions of new acres to the plow by placing under cultivation huge tracts of "virgin lands" in the Southern RSFSR and, largely, in Northern Kazakhstan. This "virgin

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lands" scheme has overshadowed all else.

The idea was not new with Khrushchev, but in the past both Russian and Western experts had successfully warned against such an undertaking. The great bulk of the tracts lie in the semi-arid regions of Kazakhstan where the average rainfall is too low for normal farming. Constantly threatening is a situation far worse than the dust bowl in the American Plains States during the drought of the mid-1930's.

Although not totally unaware of the dangers, Khrushchev was faced with either taking the gamble or paying the price of significantly reduced investments for industry in order to obtain the vast funds necessary to increase the output of fertilizers, irrigation networks and other costly items necessary to boost production in the old established agricultural areas. (Russia's small grain yields have averaged about 11 bushels per acre as contrasted to US yields of nearly 18 bushels.) Not only did the average Russian citizen wish to eat higher off the hog, but a population growing by some 4 million a year had many more mouths to feed.

But as the Soviet economist S. Kheynman underlined in 1959, the Stalinist dictum that "the cardinal proposition . . . that heavy industry must be given priority . . ." was to stand. The "virgin lands" scheme was thus all the more alluring, for in spite of the magnitude of the venture, relatively little capital outlay was required and, if successful, it would have gone a long way toward solving the production problem.

By 1956 most of the new lands were under the plow and an exceptionally good crop of nearly 25 million (metric) tons of grain was harvested in Kazakhstan. This was more than four times the output of the Republic in the last year prior to introduction of the scheme. Khrushchev, prematurely as it turned out, boasted that results proved how wrong his critics had been. But in December of last year the Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevitch, was demoted, saddled with much of the blame for a disastrous crop in 1960. Although Matskevitch was the obvious scapegoat and would have been sacrificed anyway, the first mark against him in Khrushchev's book may well have been the Minister's public observation, that 1956 had witnessed the best rainfall in Kazakhstan in half a century. With the exception of a bad crop in 1957, the weather *had* been particularly kind to the gamble in Kazakhstan, but such luck could not last forever; the 1959 yields were down and in 1960 the hot winds blew.

The 1960 plan for Kazakhstan called for the production of nearly 25 million tons of grain, but the official agricultural newspaper *Sel'skaya Zhizn* of October 16, 1960, records that with the Kazakhstan harvest "virtually completed" less than half, some 12 million tons, was actually achieved.

Since the new lands program has been a major attempt to correct some serious Soviet problems, the portent of the 1960 failure is great not only for the economy and the people but for Premier Khrushchev as well. In toto the "virgin lands" have added more than 20 percent to the cultivated area in Russia, a most tenuous base upon which the economy has become increasingly dependent. The current seven-year plan leans heavily upon advances in agriculture. Thus, as the Soviet economist Shlikhter has documented, much of the future expansion of industry is dependent upon a major reduction in the manpower needs of farming. If recent high levels of food output cannot be sustained, much less increased, by the exploitation of the land through the huge, specialized grain farms established in the new lands experiments (which require relatively little manpower) agriculture cannot spare the millions of hands needed for industrial growth.

None of this evidence permits one to predict a serious man-made famine, such as the one resulting from Stalin's forced collectivization policies of the early thirties, or the cessation of growth of Russian industry. However, both the hopes of the individual consumer and the plans for industry can be expected to suffer setbacks if the failures of the Khrushchev panaceas continue to mount. Undoubtedly the Premier's hold on the system is now so great that he can weather any storm short of a military disaster, but his prestige will diminish when his subordinates and the people come to realize that the repeatedly promised miracles in agriculture fail to materialize.

Since he is in his mid-60's Khrushchev cannot be expected to stand the strain of his office very much longer; his successor is undoubtedly now lurking in the wings, promoting new solutions to Russia's major problem. Sometime in the not too distant future another secret speech may sound in the Kremlin's halls. Documenting Khrushchev's major sin of failing to deliver on the promise of institutionalizing the "Leninist principle of collective leadership," there will be a citation of Khrushchev's blindness to the sound advice of the agricultural experts. Even if the absolute disaster is somehow avoided in Kazakhstan, Khrushchev has over-extended himself. And not the least of the penalties is Russia's inability to satisfy fully the serious demands for food of the Communist brethren in China, themselves the victims of crop failures.

Starvation may be rampant in China before next year's rice can be harvested, and Khrushchev's failure to improve Russian agriculture may have provided President Kennedy with the greatest opportunity he will ever have to strike a blow for peace. Could Mao possibly afford to reject a no-strings-attached offer of quantities of American grain sufficient to save millions of Chinese lives?

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THE MEANING OF MOVING FORWARD – VIII

Long-Term Foreign Aid

The principal initial effort of the Kennedy Administration in the field of foreign economic policy will be – and should be – to establish the principle of long-term economic aid to the less-developed countries. This means Congressional authorization for the Development Loan Fund to borrow aid money from the Treasury and thus to avoid perennial battles with the House Appropriations Committee.

In Congress at least, the pros and cons are by now well known; what is needed is the White House whiplash that was never applied in '59, and a determination to fix the levels of authorized annual borrowing, at the outset, as high as the political traffic will permit. If loans for Latin America are to be handled wholly through the new Inter-American Bank, then $1.25 billion per year over a four- or five-year period can serve as a minimum target. Financing at this level will be necessary if the US is to play its role alongside Western Europe in the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development discussed in these pages recently by Senator Javits.

The merits of long-term financing for the DLF have been accepted for years in expert circles. The central emerging issue of foreign economic policy is a more fundamental one. This concerns the soundness of the present repayment basis of our loans to the developing countries – that is, short-term repayment in local currencies. A typical loan made either by the US or the international finance agencies is repayable over, say, 15 years, in installments beginning after a two- to three-year period of grace. Yet even the most casual projections show that such terms bear no relation to the probable ability of the recipient countries to pay and are thus certain to lead to grave future economic complications for the borrower.

During the Third Five Year Plan now beginning, India, to take the case of one of the principal recipients of Western aid, must meet debt installments (and interest) amounting to $1.166 billion. On the basis of debts outstanding at the end of 1959, another $959 million will fall due during the Fourth Plan. And taking into account the estimated $5 billion of new debt which will be contracted to finance the Third Plan, this $959 million could easily jump to $2 billion, pointing to a total of $3 billion in installments and interest during the Fourth Plan. Such a repayment burden will place a great strain on limited foreign exchange reserves, will virtually cancel out the new aid influx and may even lead to a general breakdown of economic development. Similar projections can be made for Turkey, Brazil and, indeed, most of the developing countries.

If the West means seriously to see through its part of the task of economic development in selected countries, such as India, which have the requisite political and administrative strength, loans should entail no repayment for, say, 25 years, and should then have installments spaced out over another 25 years. (As this journal has pointed out previously, the British bonds which made possible our railroad construction a century ago were on a 50-year basis.) Repayment might then be shifted from the present local currency basis to repayment in dollars, for the increasingly industrialized countries of Asia and Africa will then have new supplies of dollars gained from trade with the West. The local currencies now being accumulated by the US (the figure will reach an astonishing $12 billion in various currencies by 1965 at the present rate) are raising the specter of Western economic imperialism in nationalist eyes. And these currencies do not find their way back to the US economy. They are a cover for what is in effect a gift rather than a loan. No doubt some grants should be included in our aid program, as Sir Oliver Franks suggested last spring in his report to the World Bank, but this would encounter more Congressional antagonism than long-term hard loans.

Opposition in Congress to an effective foreign economic policy can be expected to grow in intensity with each year of our national adjustment to an increasingly competitive world economy. Even more than in the case of aid, the President will need to expend considerable energy and persuasion should he seek replacement of the escape clause in the reciprocal trade legislation with "trade adjustment" measures providing for compensation to workers and investors hard-hit by foreign imports. (The Trade Act does not expire until June 30, 1962, but renewal might usefully be sought well in advance.)

This will also be the case if he seeks discretionary authority to negotiate tariff reductions. Nevertheless, such trade policies are essential if the United States is to maintain a strong bargaining position in dealings with Europe's Common Market and Outer Six and Seven groupings.

Last of a series.

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Castro's Cuba Revisited

Five months is a long time in the life of a revolution. On my return to Cuba for 10 days over New Year's, I could see that great changes had taken place since last summer. The impressive positive achievements of the Castro regime had been intensified, but so had those aspects of it which must be disquieting to any visiting American. Because my stay was so short, I saw less this time than in July and August. I can, therefore, give only a tentative, personal report; and since our government has now banned further travel to the island, I may not be able to go back for a long time to come.

The most encouraging side of the new Cuba remains out in the countryside, on the cooperatives and the new, heavily-capitalized state farms. Unemployment is down, and agricultural production is up, in some cases spectacularly. It should be borne in mind that Cuba had an enormous amount of unused land and labor available when the revolution came into power, and that the production of such crops as beans and cotton was so low that high percentage increases are misleading. The US Embassy ridicules these claims, but even allowing for a considerable amount of exaggeration it seems clear that production has risen substantially despite all the dislocations attendant upon the agrarian reform program. Having visited the *El Modelo* state turkey farm in Pinar del Rio Province, and talked with John Michael, the Montana-born manager who runs it, I am convinced that his figures, at least, are correct, and the Embassy's wrong. Turkeys used to be a luxury in Cuba, with a few hundred frozen birds flown in for expensive Havana groceries; Mr. Michael shipped 42,000 birds out for Christmas, and expects to be producing 50,000 a month at the end of 1961.

Other constructive activities of the regime also continue to be impressive. The housing program, bigger than anything of its kind in Latin America, is going ahead at full steam; the big Havana East Development outside the capital has already admitted its first tenant-owners. Textile workers I talked to in the town of Bauta told me they had been working overtime for more than a year and getting better wages than ever before. Although the amount of money in circulation has doubled over the past two years, rigid price controls have kept inflation in check. Despite the absence of American goods, stores are pretty well stocked with staple items of food and clothing; the economy has survived the shock of the sugar quota cut and the embargo remarkably well. But with dollar reserves nearly exhausted, no American or Cuban businesses left to expropriate, and the Russian and Chinese loans expended on industrial equipment, Ché Guevara's National Bank faces a payments squeeze that even his ingenuity may be unable to overcome. Cuba's default on her dollar bonds last month, after faithfully meeting interest payments for two years, is probably a sign of an approaching crisis.

Still more troublesome to the regime is the by now massive defection of the middle classes, an element of society much larger in Cuba than in most Latin American countries. Since my last visit, Castro had begun to seize *Cuban*-owned businesses; in October, with the Urban Reform Law, he wiped out all private investment in urban real estate and began to turn houses and apartments over to the tenants living in them. These measures alienated well-to-do Cubans who had been pleased to see United Fruit, IT&T, and American and Foreign Power given their walking papers. Businessmen, doctors, teachers, engineers and the propertied class in general have turned against Castro, and about 1,000 people a week were leaving the island until the break in relations cut off the possibility of flight. One INRA lawyer, an enthusiastic supporter of the revolution, told me that less than one in three of his professional colleagues was now pro-Castro.

To control internal dissent and to guard against invasion by anti-Castro forces openly training in Florida and Guatemala, the regime has clamped down on the opposition in various ways. *Información*, the last privately-owned paper, and the English-language *Havana Times* both closed down, for economic reasons, in December; with imports monopolized by the government and most big companies confiscated, advertising revenues will not support an independent press. Radio and television are all government controlled, and Ruby Hart Phillips told me that the *New York Times* planned to eliminate shipments to Cuba because the National Bank would not release dollars to pay for them. Harassment of foreign newsmen has been stepped up; while I was in Havana, Wilson Hall of NBC was held incommunicado for three days and released without an explanation. I myself was briefly arrested and held for an hour and a half because of an ill-timed attempt at a joke. When a waiter at the airport restaurant told me he was unable to turn down the loudspeakers that were blaring out Fidel's speech on January 2, I said that I thought a lot of Cubans would be deaf if their *Jefe Maximo* kept speaking so loud and so often. He hurried off and called the police. I was very politely treated, and released almost at once; some Americans and thousands of Cubans have not got off so easily.

The *Prensa Latina* agency that now monopolizes the news in Cuba follows the Soviet line on every question, even such seemingly distant ones as germ warfare in

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Korea, the Hungarian revolt and the current troubles in Laos and the Congo. When Mikoyan visited Havana a year ago he was visibly embarrassed by anti-Soviet news stories and questions about the satellite nations; nothing like that could happen today. Anti-Communist publications have disappeared from the newsstands, and have been replaced by piles of books and magazines printed in Spanish in Moscow, Peking and the Soviet printing plant in Montevideo. To the dishonesty and distortions of the Cuban press I can give some personal testimony. While I was in Havana I looked up the press attaché at the American Embassy, whom I had met last summer. He very courteously offered to arrange a meeting for a group of visiting Americans with Mr. Braddock, the Chargé d'Affaires, and we informally stuck a notice up on the bulletin board in the Havana Riviera Hotel. Next day, when the story of "an imminent Yankee invasion" broke, this innocent invitation was cited as "firm proof" that the Marines were about to land; every newspaper printed the completely false statement that the Embassy had called an "urgent" meeting to give "important news" to all American citizens. Mr. Braddock wisely cancelled the meeting, lest it be subject to further misrepresentation. I then called *Prensa Latina* and gave them the true story; the man at the other end promised to see that a correction was printed, but nothing ever appeared.

Another distressing aspect of the regime, besides its enthusiastic alliance with the Soviet bloc, is the growing influence of PSP (Communist) officials in the government. The head of the National Printing Office is a member of the PSP; to judge from the dozens of Communists from Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile, etc., invited for the New Year celebrations, so are the directors of the newly-formed People's Friendship Institute. As Ursinio Rojas, a Communist and director of the Havana Branch of the key Sugar Workers' Union explained it to me, "We have no ideological difference with the Revolution, and we all work together with it. Fidel trusts us because we work hard, and he knows that we aren't going to run off to Miami some day." Whenever there are conflicts within the labor movement, Fidel steps in personally and throws his weight behind the PSP element. David Salvador, a former head of the Cuban Labor Confederation, is in jail, after an attempt at surreptitious flight, and the non-Communist officials of the Electrical Workers' Union were ousted at a meeting packed with *fidelistas*; their leader, Amaury Fraginals, is in hiding somewhere in Havana.

January 2, the last day I spent in Cuba, was the most disquieting of all. Havana took on the appearance of an armed camp, with field artillery parked along the Malecon Drive, dozens of Russian tanks rumbling through the Plaza Civica, and tens of thousands of marching militia men and women armed with Czechoslovak machine guns. Fidel, obviously disturbed by increasing acts of sabotage and terrorism inside Cuba, and by the barrage of threats and propaganda issuing from Miami and Swan Island, was more violent than ever. He repeatedly warned of an invasion by American forces "before January 20th," prodded the US into breaking relations by cutting our Embassy staff down to an impossibly small number, and announced that the revolution would search out its enemies in the wealthy neighborhoods, "street by street, and house by house." Less than 600 people have been executed up to the present time, all of them murderers from the Batista days or rebels captured with arms in their hands. But if the situation gets much worse, a real reign of terror might begin on the island.

What will happen next in Cuba depends to an enormous extent on what President Kennedy and Dean Rusk do in the months to come. The Eisenhower policy of the exchange of insults, economic and diplomatic coercion, and encouragement of anti-Castro military forces, has so far succeeded only in driving Fidel where he was evidently not too reluctant to go, into the arms of Nikita Khrushchev. The new Administration can have no illusions about the possibility of turning the clock back in Cuba or of restoring the island as an economic colony of the United States. Despite the defections pointed out above, I believe that Castro still has the support of a substantial majority of the Cuban people; out in the countryside, I have never met anybody who was not a *fidelista*. (When I asked the people in Bauta if there were any counter-revolutionaries in the town, they laughed and said, "Yes, there is one. Would you like to meet him?")

Cuba today has a larger proportion of its people under arms than any other nation on earth; the few abortive uprisings so far have been easily put down by the local militia, led by a few captains from the Rebel Army. Nothing less than a full-scale military operation, with landing craft, air cover, and tens of thousands of troops, could establish a bridgehead on the island; the small Cuban forces training so ostentatiously in the Everglades and at Retalhuleu in Guatemala seem to me to be heading for slaughter, no matter how much help they may get from our Central Intelligence Agency. And a real American invasion of the island, despite Fidel's fears, is of course out of the question. An official of the Cuban Foreign Office to whom I spoke said that he was dubious about any betterment of relations once Eisenhower was gone, but that with Kennedy in the White House there might be "a little hope." Despite the giant leftward steps Castro has taken (or has been forced to take) over the past year, it still seems to me that the only sensible course open to us is one of patience, forebearance, and continued attempts to reach some kind of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet *bloc's* defiant little ally to the south of us.

SAMUEL SHAPIRO

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Who Will Make Monetary Policy?

by Michael D. Reagan

Will Kennedy and his economic aides in the Council of Economic Advisers and the Treasury operate "on the same wave length" with Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board, as Helen Hill Miller hopefully suggests in concluding her excellent articulation of monetary checks and balances (*NR*, January 23)? Or, to continue the analogy, is static interference the more probable result of fragmented authority over economic policy? In any case, should the fate of the economy be dependent upon the accident of sympatico personalities, or should monetary-fiscal coordination be built into the structure by the exercise of Presidential leadership in *both* areas?

The structural answer seems to me the more appropriate one on grounds of its effectiveness and improved accountability for the monetary authority. The constitutional checks and balances are enough, I think, without our adding any further impediments to effective government. Also, I am somewhat pessimistic over the immediate prospects for Federal Reserve-Administration harmony. Let me explain why.

Taking the last point first, we should note that Martin's money managers were reported a few weeks ago to feel that "things aren't too bad now" and that a "solid pickup" can be expected by spring. I doubt that the new CEA will agree; the Samuelson task force certainly did not. Secondly, the Fed was occasionally at odds with the Administration even during the Eisenhower years because Ike's advisers were at least marginally more disturbed over signs of downturn than was the Fed. It is difficult to believe that such differences in attitude will not be more pronounced with a more liberal Administration. And the shift of Robert Roosa from Fed to Treasury cannot guarantee harmony any greater than resulted, or rather did not result, from Martin's 1951 move from the Treasury to the Fed.

Finally, when the time comes to fight inflation again, the Administration may want to place greater reliance on the fiscal tool of a budgetary surplus than on tight money. The Fed is unlikely to agree. And Martin has declared that the Fed has a right to ignore Administration policy in case of basic conflict. Unfortunately, current organizational arrangements give considerable support to his position.

The President is expected to manage our defense and is able to install a man of his choice at the Pentagon. He is expected to manage the economy – under the mandate of the Employment Act of 1946 – and he is able to put his own men into the Treasury, the Budget Bureau and the Council of Economic Advisers – but he is *not* at liberty immediately to affect the policies of the Fed by appointing as its Chairman a man sympathetic to his own sense of priorities. The Chairman of the Fed has a four-year term that expires in April, 1963. Conservatives who fear inflation far more than they do unemployment have been more aware of this anomaly and its potential significance than have liberals. Just read the *Wall Street Journal* to see the emphasis placed on the "independence" of the Fed from Presidential control as a bulwark against the "demands of debtors for a greater supply of free money." While not everyone would put the matter as baldly (if incompletely) as the *Journal*, economists do seem to be in substantial agreement that in the short run a hard choice has to be made between employment and growth or price stability. And the Fed is oriented toward, and better suited to pursuing, the latter.

How did the Federal Reserve Board get itself into a position where it can tell the President to "go fly a kite" if he doesn't like a Fed policy, as Editor Elliott Bell of *Business Week* has said? And what can be done to bring the Fed back into the government, so as to make monetary policy accountable to electorally-approved national leadership?

The first question is the easier one: the situation arose through historical accident. When the Federal Reserve System was established in 1913, it was conceived as having the limited, non-political function of servicing banking and commerce by providing a pool of resources for emergencies and by making semi-automatic adjustments in the money supply. Two World Wars, a depression, and the vastly increased size of the federal budget and debt resulting from these changed the Fed into an instrument with major leverage. Its function now is to maintain general economic stability and its impact is felt by wage-earners and pensioners, farmers and home buyers – as well as bankers and commercial concerns. In short, what began as a technical agency became a policy-making body. But its internal structure (a seven-man board with 14-year terms; group representation for commercial banking, industry, commerce and agriculture, but not for labor or pensioners; and an Open Market Committee that includes

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five Reserve Bank Presidents not appointed by the President) does not adequately reflect this newer role.

The position of the Chairman deserves special mention, for here is historical accident of the most ironic variety. Until 1935, the Chairman had no fixed term and was presumably removable by the President, as is the case in several other regulatory commissions. To clarify the situation, the Banking Act of 1935 established a four-year tenure, probably with the intent that the Chairman's term would expire with the President's, allowing a new man in the White House an immediate opportunity to appoint a compatible Chairman along with his new departmental chiefs. Because of mid-term appointments, however, it has not worked out this way. Thus an attempted clarification has had the ironic consequence of diminishing Presidential leadership.

What can be done? The simplest solution would be for the Chairman to resign now. Perhaps Martin would be reappointed by Kennedy; perhaps not. But even if he were, the President's hand would be strengthened by the simple fact that the Chairman would thereafter owe his position to Kennedy, not to Eisenhower. This solution would be in keeping with the spirit of the 1935 legislation; and Martin himself has said that "it might be preferable" if the law were changed to ensure designation of the Chairman at the beginning of the Presidential term.

If Chairman Martin should not resign – and rumor has it that he definitely will not follow the example of John McCone of the AEC – and if the President cannot secure (or dare not ask for) legislative change early in his term, what then? For a few months, perhaps nothing: in the face of recession even the Fed has temporarily turned away from fighting inflation by dampening employment. But when we start on the upswing again Presidential and Federal Reserve policies are likely to come into conflict. Should a knock-down, drag-out fight occur, political reality is on the side of the President. His superior access to public opinion and his electorally established strength would prevail over the Fed in the end. But for some weeks or months there might be an ugly situation of tug-and-haul with the economy as an innocent sufferer.

One proposal is at hand to establish presumptive Presidential authority over monetary policy and to diminish the likelihood of conflict. This is the Clark-Reuss bill (S 2382, 86th Congress, 1st Session), which has already been the subject of extensive hearings. Two of the bill's provisions (to make "reasonable price stability" an explicit goal of the Employment Act, and to provide for public hearings concerning certain price and wage increases) are not of direct relevance here. The third is. It would call upon the President to include in the program and recommendations section of his Economic Reports a statement of appropriate monetary and credit policies "to the same extent as all other policies affecting employment." (This the Eisenhower Reports have not done.) If the Federal Reserve Board did not agree with the President, its views and reasons would be included in the Report as a dissent.

Since it is most unlikely that the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board would wish to publicize his disagreement with the President in this way, such a provision would constitute a strong additional incentive for the two men to reach a bargain. The President's responsibility under the Employment Act to offer a program for general economic stability is clear; the inclusion of monetary recommendations would informally establish his superior responsibility in this sphere too, and would serve notice that he did not intend to have Administration objectives undercut by a politically almost non-accountable Federal Reserve Board.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of the Clark-Reuss approach is that this recommendation would not require legislation to go into effect. The President is now free to make monetary recommendations (as Truman did) and indeed must do so if his program is to be comprehensive and coherent. (Note that the Samuelson task force did make recommendations to Mr. Kennedy in the monetary as well as the fiscal area.) He is at liberty to include an FRB dissent in his Report to the Congress, if he wishes to do so and if the Board desires to write one.

In the short run, this may be the easiest way to get around a difficult situation, and to ensure that employment and growth are not sacrificed to absolute price stability. But in the long run it would still be desirable, I believe, to repeal the fixed-term provision and give the President the same executive freedom *vis-à-vis* the Fed that Dean Landis has proposed for all other regulatory commissions. Only by this structural tightening of the policy machine can the requisite coordination be assured. And if the government is to be held accountable for the nation's economic health, to quote Elliott Bell again, "There must be a chain of responsibility reaching through the Presidency to all the instrumentalities that do the stabilizing."

NEXT WEEK: *"Encounter in Leningrad" – a report on the realm of the personal in Soviet literary life today*

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Nuclear Pacifism

Some Reflections on the Community of Fear

by Robert W. Tucker

A pamphlet recently published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, California, has been getting a good deal of notice. Written by Harrison Brown and James Real, and bearing the title "Community of Fear," it is addressed to two questions: What is the nature of the arms race? What are the consequences of its perpetuation likely to be?

Within the scope of a few pages the authors describe the various revolutions in military technology since World War II, point out the probable effects of nuclear weapons when used against urban centers, and indicate the types of attack that might be made against the United States. Assuming that the arms race continues uncontrolled, little reason is found for believing that the development of invulnerable retaliatory forces will result in a system in which neither side will be able to destroy the other's retaliatory forces in a first strike and consequently neither will be tempted to undertake a first strike. The possibility of a stable system of deterrence presupposes, in the first place, no further radical breakthroughs in weapons technology. But Brown and Real insist that "we can expect in the years ahead many more 'breakthroughs' which will lead to a number of startling and unexpected developments." Moreover, the authors are persuaded that factors other than technological will operate to render a deterrent system basically unstable. As nuclear-missile forces proliferate and become more complex, the possibility of "administrative accidents" or simply of unauthorized action may be expected to increase. The finite chance that a nuclear conflict will be triggered accidentally, always present in a deterrent system involving only two major powers, will increase appreciably with the emergence of other nuclear powers. The latter development also creates the novel possibility that nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union may result from the action of some third nation whose leadership had concluded that it could profit from the ensuing catastrophe.

But if the authors regard the prospects for achieving a stable deterrent system as slight, the hazards incurred by engaging in small or limited wars are considered very great. Indeed, the possibility of limited non-nuclear wars is almost summarily dismissed. The authors are convinced that nuclear weapons would eventually be introduced at some stage of a conflict that exceeds the merest brushfire, and that once employed they would prove extremely difficult to control.

Nor do the prospects for arms control and disarmament evoke their optimism. Any escape from the vicious circle in which we find ourselves is seen as blocked by the very dynamics of the arms race and the increasing insecurity it engenders, as well as by domestic groups deeply committed to its perpetuation. The military are singled out for special attention. We are told that there is a "military elite emerging in the United States which is dedicated to a position of perpetual hostility toward the Soviet Union and which wields enormous political as well as military power," that this elite is unalterably opposed to arms control and is supported in its opposition by tens of thousands of scientists and technicians whose lives are devoted to the new weaponry, that the military elite is "clearly in a position to assume actual political command over the US striking forces if there are serious signs of 'weakness' in US foreign relations," and that "if things continue the way they are going, the possibility of a *coup* by the United States military is real." These are serious charges, though no evidence is offered in support of them.

At any rate, the substance of Brown and Real's analysis clearly points to the great probability of the continuation of an uncontrolled arms race, the next phase of which they see as dominated by an emphasis on civilian defense. But once societies decide to go underground a significant retreat from the idea that war is obsolescent will have occurred. The conviction that survival is still compatible with the present state of the art of war requires only that men accept and adjust themselves to living in holes.

The final section of the pamphlet asks whether war

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is obsolete. The answer given is both yes and no. Ultimately the answer must be yes: "If the arms race continues and if man survives that race, it will eventually end as a grotesque stalemate involving weapons of such enormous destructiveness that they simply cannot be used – nor can their use be effectively threatened." Provisionally, however, the answer may be no "because people might *believe* that wars can be fought without fantastic danger. In other words, people might believe the consequences of war to be less terrible than the consequences of not being both able and willing to fight a war." (Despite the phrase "in other words" these two statements are not equivalent. People might well believe that war can only be fought with "fantastic danger" though still regard the consequences of war "less terrible" than the consequences of not being both able and willing to fight a war.) As long as nations are willing to take the risks implicit in nuclear conflict, force and the threat of force will remain the *ultima ratio* of their disagreements. "It is clear," a concluding passage reads, "that ending the war system demands the common consent of *all* the world's powers – those now capable of nuclear military adventure and those who one day may be."

Brown and Real do not propose any solutions, though they say that if the problems we face are unprecedented, "like most problems they are soluble once they are understood." But exactly what are we to understand? Reinhold Niebuhr has written in a foreword to the pamphlet that the implication "is confined to the simple conviction that we are involved in a race which neither we nor the Russians can win," a race which must eventually lead to disaster "even if neither side consciously desires the ultimate war."

I am not so certain this is the only implication that may reasonably be drawn. Whatever the authors' intent, the kind of future held out as increasingly probable, unless history suddenly takes an altogether unexpected leap, will be understood by many as providing support for renouncing a deterrent strategy and undertaking to disarm unilaterally. There is admittedly no compelling logical reason why the pamphlet must have this effect. But there is a very compelling psychological reason. The possibility of resolving the nuclear dilemma through the continued pursuit of present strategies is all but discounted. The prospects held out by current schemes of arms control and disarmament, even if domestic opposition to these schemes can be overcome, are similarly discounted. What then is left? Surely the implication is not seriously intended that all we can do is patiently to wait and pray for the day when the war system will finally be ended by the common consent of all the world's powers!

If renouncing the use of nuclear weapons and undertaking to disarm unilaterally does constitute one possible solution to the nuclear dilemma it must be given serious consideration. Even if it forms an impossible solution it should be dealt with seriously in view of the issues raised and the increasing number of people attracted by an impossible solution. Certainly no useful purpose is served simply by assimilating the advocacy of nuclear abnegation to the traditional form of Christian pacifism which condemns any use of force between nations as a violation of the Christian law of love. No doubt with some it is just that. But to insist it is only, or even primarily, that is to obscure the novel moral-political issues forced on men by the new military technology.

The Quantitative Pacifists

More relevant is the occasional criticism that nuclear pacifism differs from traditional Christian pacifism in that it is a pacifism determined by numbers rather than by pure principle. The nuclear pacifists, therefore, are not absolute but only relative pacifists; they have substituted a kind of "quantitative" pacifism in place of the older "qualitative" pacifism. If amended to read that numbers must at some point determine principle and that quantitative considerations must at some point determine qualitative considerations, this criticism lays bare the distinctive and the essential argument of nuclear pacifism. There is surely a point beyond which most men are pacifists in the sense that they will consider the sacrifice of values resulting from the employment of force to outweigh those values which may be preserved only through force. In this sense the centuries-old *bellum justum* doctrine of the Catholic Church is pacifist. In the same sense the moral doctrines long professed – though not always practiced – by most Western nations have been pacifist. Although the point beyond which force may lose any justification cannot be determined in the abstract and with certainty, it does not follow that it cannot be determined at all. That it depends upon circumstance and a judgment which may always prove fallible does not warrant the conclusion that it is therefore nonexistent. Whoever takes this position must refuse to acknowledge that there need be any limits whatever placed on the use of force.

The strength of nuclear pacifism may be found then in its refusal to make an absolute of the norm of nonviolence and in its insistence that there are nevertheless limits beyond which force has no justification. But it is just this strength that also turns out to be a peculiar weakness, since in practice – when applied to a concrete situation – the case for relative pacifism is likely to be both complicated and uncertain. In this respect, it is worth recalling that the appeal of absolute pacifism always stemmed in large measure just from its apparent "purity" and simplicity. Whether in its Christian or secular form, absolute pacifism subordinates as

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a matter of pure principle all other claims to the ideal of non-violence. It is not for this reason "unconcerned" with consequences, if unconcern is equated with moral indifference. It is unconcerned with consequences only in the sense that whatever the consequences, they cannot affect the absolute validity of the norm of non-violence or justify any departures from this norm. This is precisely what is meant by making an absolute of non-violence. It is also the meaning of the criticism that absolute pacifism can be maintained only at the price of social responsibility. Yet it is this very purity of absolute pacifism that permits adherents to ignore the uncertain and disputed contingencies marking every conflict situation and to avoid concerning themselves with the probable consequences of pursuing alternative political strategies. Even more important, absolute pacifism relieves its adherents from the constant necessity of distinguishing among greater and lesser evils and from the nagging uncertainty that nearly always attends the act of choosing to preserve some values at the expense of others.

The relative pacifism of those who would renounce any further dependence on nuclear weapons and if need be disarm unilaterally is not simply a position of pure principle. Moral principle is of course involved. Indeed, the one irreducible issue raised by nuclear pacifism is clearly a moral issue. Nevertheless, in all its versions the validity of nuclear pacifism is sooner or later largely dependent on facts – or at least on what are presumed to be facts. Inevitably, this dependence complicates the case for nuclear pacifism.

It has been contended often enough by the nuclear pacifists in Britain, here and elsewhere, that we know the facts, or at least that we know sufficient facts. We know the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Despite some uncertainty, we know the effects of radiation. We have a reasonably clear picture of the damage nuclear weapons would do if used against urban centers. But it is not primarily upon these facts that the case for nuclear pacifism really depends. Instead, it depends on the possibility or the probability that these weapons will some day be used, and that if used they will be used in a certain way with certain effects. Statements of this sort, however, are not simple statements of fact; they are assumptions to which one may attach a varying degree of plausibility.

Choosing Amidst Uncertainties

No one can speak today with much assurance, however, about the possibilities of creating a stable deterrent system, or about the promise of arms control in the absence of political stability, or about how arms control might contribute to a stable system of deterrence, or about the effect that a nuclear testing agreement might have upon preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, or about the prospects of engaging in limited war without precipitating an all-out nuclear conflict, or about a score of other vital matters that must affect the judgments men reach. It should be abundantly clear by now that it is these uncertainties which so often divide reasonable men and set them at odds over the political strategies considered desirable and wise. To be sure, men must still make choices, however precarious the assumptions that form the basis of those choices, and there is no reason to single out the nuclear pacifists for criticism simply because the strategy they urge is based on assumptions that might eventually prove unfounded. But it is at least necessary to acknowledge that the case for nuclear pacifism does not rest simply upon unassailable facts which are self-evident save to the perverse and the blind.

"I Wasn't Beaten In Any Election"

Nor is the case for nuclear pacifism self-evident on purely moral grounds. In order to demonstrate the compelling quality of the moral argument, however, the nuclear pacifists have a penchant for insisting that the worst conceivable outcome of a nuclear conflict be taken as the most probable, if not indeed the only conceivable, outcome of any nuclear conflict. We are, therefore, usually asked how anyone can possibly justify engaging in a war that must end not only in the mutual annihilation of the immediate participants but in the destruction of all life. Some years ago Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook engaged in an exchange in which Lord Russell insisted on posing the problem

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in just these terms. Professor Hook was placed in the rather unenviable position of insisting that even in the "limiting case" the choice is not self-evident, though he did add that "here every lover of freedom and of life is on uncertain and tragic ground." This is perhaps carrying understatement to an excess, but I find it difficult to disagree with Hook's contention. I may not believe that choosing to wage such an ultimate conflict could ever be justified. Nor may I see any justification for engaging in a conflict that would fall well short of this ultimate level of destruction. But these moral preferences are not self-evident. There are a number of people who do not share them and for reasons that cannot simply be dismissed as the product of unbalanced minds. It may be distressing to find that there is such a thing as an irreducible moral issue. Yet there are such issues and they may persist even though no dispute exists over the "facts" that affect the moral judgments men make.

The Cataclysmic Conclusion

It is, of course, the "limiting case" that gives the position of the nuclear pacifists the purity and simplicity of absolute pacifism while apparently freeing them from the latter's weaknesses. It is not easy to accept the onus of possibly putting an end to history. Nor is it surprising that the nuclear pacifists have been reluctant to consider any other result issuing from nuclear conflict. For the further one moves from the "limiting case" the less forceful and persuasive the argument for nuclear pacifism appears. There is admittedly no reason why the argument should not apply to a nuclear conflict that falls far short of complete annihilation. Then we have the question: how far short? Should it apply to a conflict exceeding 100 million casualties? Or should it apply to a conflict which would involve 20 million casualties? Is the decisive criterion not simply the millions of casualties but the prospects a society might have of recovering from the effects of nuclear conflict? If it is the latter, what does "recovery" mean? Must it be equated with the preservation of an effective political authority and the probability that within a number of years the prewar Gross National Product might once again be attained? Does a society ever really "recover" from the brutalizing effects of the type of conflict we have already experienced twice in this century?

These are difficult and agonizing questions, but men must somehow make up their minds about them. Yet there is no moral calculus implicit in relative pacifism that might permit them to be answered with clarity let alone with moral certainty. Even if the general proposition that forms the heart of the relative pacifist's argument is accepted without reservation, uncertainty over its application would still remain. This uncertainty cannot be banished by concentrating only upon the "limiting case." Nor can this uncertainty be overcome by insisting that nothing can justify the use of nuclear weapons or even the threat to use them, regardless of the circumstances attending their use or the consequences that might follow from refusing to use them. To so insist is to take a position indistinguishable from absolute pacifism. It abandons any attempt to weigh the possible sacrifice of values following from the use of nuclear weapons against the sacrifice that might follow from refusing to use or even threatening to use them. The English historian Herbert Butterfield has recently written: "Let us be clear about one important fact: the destructiveness which some people are prepared to contemplate is not to be justified for the sake of any conceivable mundane object, any purported religious claim or supramundane purpose, or any virtue that one system of organization can possess as against another." This is assuredly not a "fact," but a moral judgment. How can Butterfield be so certain of this judgment? Would the *certainty* of a nuclear conflict involving, let us say, between 30 and 40 million deaths be too great a sacrifice of value even though taken to preserve the freedom and independence of Western Europe? Philip Toynbee has written that "surely anything is better than a policy which allows for the *possibility* of nuclear war." Does this mean, for example, that a Soviet occupation of Western Europe is surely better than a policy which carries a five percent risk of nuclear war?

I have no wish to caricature the moral judgments of sincere and sensitive men, though the measure of one's moral sensitivity and humanitarian sentiment is not determined simply by the degree to which one publicly anguishes over the horrible prospects of nuclear war. Is it not time to acknowledge, however, that equally sincere and sensitive men may disagree with the above judgments? Perhaps even more to the point, is it not time to acknowledge that men who quite agree with the central proposition of relative pacifism may still disagree over the application of this proposition? The nuclear pacifists, though professing relative pacifism, all too often want the moral certainty of absolute pacifism. They cannot have it.

If nuclear pacifism is to be regarded as not merely a "witness" in the classical Christian sense but as a relevant political strategy, what are its consequences likely to be? It is surely not unreasonable to estimate the consequences of renouncing the nuclear deterrent and disarming unilaterally by asking ourselves how this nation might act if the Soviets were suddenly to adopt this course, though remaining otherwise committed to their purposes. Is it reasonable to expect that in such circumstances we would immediately follow the Soviet lead? Or is it more reasonable to assume that we would do what we once sought to do (not very

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successfully it is true, though the circumstances were less propitious than those we are presently entertaining) and use our monopoly of nuclear weapons to create a world order expressive of our desires and purposes? This question may prove annoying, and not only to the nuclear pacifists. Yet there cannot be much doubt about the answer. We would be sorely tempted to impose our views on a recalcitrant and unreconciled, though no longer effectively resistant, Soviet Union. Under what canon of logic or of common sense can it be assumed that the Soviets would behave with greater restraint?

If past experience is to prove at all relevant in this matter it is only reasonable to expect that the Soviets would behave with far less restraint. Granted we cannot *know* precisely how the Soviets would act in these purely hypothetical circumstances, but it is clear that the degrees of restraint they might choose to exercise would depend almost entirely upon them, since they would have in effect a monopoly of force. Any attempt at organized military resistance to Soviet blandishments would very likely prove futile. Such resistance would have to be undertaken with non-nuclear weapons. Yet the one essential condition that holds out at least the possibility of conducting limited non-nuclear war would be missing. At any point of their choosing, the Soviets could raise the level of violence to include nuclear weapons without fear of effective reprisals.

It is true that other forms of resistance might still be employed, though it borders on the absurd to place any real confidence in their effectiveness. According to some of the nuclear pacifists, we should not lightly dismiss the possibilities held out by a Ghandian policy of non-violent resistance. But the effectiveness of non-violent resistance, which generally combines economic pressure and moral suasion, cannot be considered apart from the circumstances in which it is undertaken. In the case of India it proved to be reasonably effective because, among other reasons, the British were inhibited from going beyond a certain point in repressing resistance. The oppressed were in the rather fortunate position of being able to appeal to their oppressors in terms of values the oppressors themselves professed. These advantages could not be relied on in a Soviet-dominated world. And even if they could it should not be forgotten that India achieved her independence only after British power had declined sufficiently to make the granting of independence perhaps the only prudent course of action.

Half-way Houses

The nuclear pacifists cannot be wholly oblivious to the foregoing considerations. A reluctance to accept any or all of the likely consequences of nuclear pacifism is reflected in various modified proposals which fall short of clear and unambiguous advocacy of this position. A good conscience is thereby preserved, presumably at not too great a price. Thus some of the would-be nuclear pacifists have been content simply to insist that "we must never use the weapons." Others have sought to clarify this vague exhortation by urging that we expressly disavow the strategy of nuclear deterrence, but not go so far as to disarm unilaterally. Frequently, an insistence that we disavow the strategy of deterrence is coupled with insistence upon "stopping the arms race." Presumably, the latter demand means that we ought immediately to withdraw from the missile race, undertake no intensive effort in the area of civil defense, cease research on new – and conceivably even more destructive – weapons, and so on.

Yet if we renounce a strategy of nuclear deterrence, and mean that renunciation, there is nothing to be gained by retaining the weapons which have given substance to this strategy. On the contrary, the retention of nuclear weapons would defeat the supposed intent of our renunciation. As long as these weapons are retained the adversary could not reasonably be expected to believe that we would never use them, either "preventively" or to retaliate against a direct attack. Without actually disarming, and somehow managing effectively to demonstrate that we had disarmed, nothing can be expected to persuade him of this. But he might very well be induced to believe we no longer intend to retaliate with nuclear weapons unless we are directly attacked. Surely our allies could easily be induced to believe that we would no longer risk nuclear conflict for their sakes – it is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent them from believing anything else. However absolute and unqualified our renunciation of nuclear weapons, as long as the weapons are retained, the renunciation can only persuade others we intend to restrict the risk of nuclear conflict to the sole contingency of a direct attack. Prudence may eventually require this disavowal, though the price of prudence would be to sacrifice the interests of allies. Even so, the critical issues nuclear pacifism addresses itself to would not be resolved. These issues would remain, though the contingencies to which they applied would be narrowed.

The further demand that we initiate unilateral measures to stop the arms race, though retaining the weapons we already possess, has been urged on the ground that by so doing we would at least create the *possibility* of escaping from the vicious circle in which both we and the Soviets are presently caught. The Soviets, it is said, might respond, once they were assured that we had really abandoned the arms race. And if they did not reciprocate we would only have abandoned a race that in the long run cannot be won, for to continue this race carries the certainty that eventually both we and our adversaries will perish. The conclusion is obvious.

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Only the irrational will refuse to accept a risk, even a very considerable risk, when the alternative is the certainty of mutual annihilation.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this proposal is that if adopted it would impose greater risks than those already inherent in undiluted nuclear pacifism. Yet it would also jeopardize the one sure "benefit" of nuclear pacifism. A consistent position of nuclear pacifism holds out at least the promise of relieving us from the hazards of nuclear conflict, whatever its other consequences. But a strategy that would have us withdraw from the arms race, while retaining the weapons already possessed at the time of withdrawal, cannot hold out this promise. If the Soviets did not respond by reciprocating in kind, we would very soon become markedly inferior to them. We would still be dangerous, however, because of the weapons we retained. In these circumstances, any serious opposition to Soviet demands would provide the adversary with a temptation to resort to a preventive strike. And this temptation would be reinforced by the fear that a nation suddenly realizing the consequences of withdrawing from the arms race might still strike out with what it has, if only in desperation. The proposal to withdraw from the arms race while retaining the weapons already possessed, to accept relative weakness while nevertheless remaining dangerous, manages to embrace the worst of all possible worlds.

All these modified proposals reflect the desire to hedge against the possible consequences of nuclear pacifism without compromising the essentials of the nuclear pacifist position. They reflect the wish to be both prudent and pure – or at least as pure as nuclear pacifism permits. This is a natural enough desire. Unfortunately, the liabilities of nuclear pacifism cannot be avoided or even substantially reduced without compromising its alleged virtues. Indeed, the case for nuclear pacifism can only be weakened by attempts to modify it, in order to make it appear more "practical" and therefore more politically palatable.

Nor is the case for nuclear pacifism strengthened by appealing to what may be termed the "risk versus certainty" argument. In all its variations, this argument poses an immediate risk against an eventual horrendous certainty and then proceeds to ask the rhetorical question: what choice must reasonable men make? Even in its more candid forms, where the magnitude of the risks incurred by nuclear abnegation are emphasized, the argument seems persuasive. The risk at least allows for hope whereas the certainty allows for nothing at all. Reasonable men do not hesitate in choosing between these alternatives.

This simple juxtaposition does not correspond to the real world. It is incontrovertible that reasonable men do not hesitate and disagree over choosing between a risk and a certainty; they disagree over choosing among alternative risks. The risks of renouncing the use of nuclear weapons and undertaking unilateral nuclear disarmament are not to be weighed against the certainty of eventual annihilation. Instead, they must be weighed against the prospects that the two sides will manage to avoid nuclear conflict during the next decade or so while using this period to devise means for averting the ultimate catastrophe. We are at last beginning to appreciate that if the means for achieving this end can somehow be fashioned they will necessitate the taking of risks, possibly considerable risks. But there are risks and risks. What nuclear pacifism urges is not simply that we must be willing to take risks but that we take a particular risk, one that would involve placing ourselves at the mercy of the adversary's "good will" – or at least his sense of restraint. It may be true that if this step is not taken, the prospects for averting the ultimate catastrophe of global nuclear war are no more than marginal. Even so, the choice is not between a risk and a certainty but between risks.

Renunciation of Politics

To sum up. Even if considered only in terms of the moral issues that are raised, the case for nuclear pacifism today is uncertain and inconclusive. This point deserves emphasis since it has frequently been assumed that whatever its political relevance – or irrelevance – nuclear pacifism as a purely moral position is unanswerable. The assumption is evidently unfounded for those who reject the essential argument of nuclear pacifism. For those who do accept this argument in principle the assumption is still unfounded. It is of course another matter to insist that we are rapidly approaching the day when the case for nuclear pacifism *will* be unanswerable, provided only that the essential position from which it proceeds is accepted by all. But that day has not yet come. Nor is nuclear pacifism an irrelevant political strategy simply because it has no prospects of acceptance. It is an irrelevant political strategy because it is really not a political strategy at all. Given the circumstances in which it must be applied, nuclear pacifism represents the renunciation of politics. In its willingness to give up the only likely means of effectively "persuading" the adversary, it abandons politics. Nuclear pacifism begins by disavowing the political irresponsibility of absolute pacifism; it ends either by sacrificing its position or by embracing the irresponsibility initially rejected. The nuclear pacifist may reply that the new military technology has forced this ironic result and that when the price of politics clearly becomes morally prohibitive there is no alternative. Again, the day when this response appears persuasive has not yet come. Still, it requires some optimism to believe that this day may not be far off.

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From the Netherworld of the Future

by T. J. Ross

In his Princeton lectures on science fiction (published as *New Maps of Hell*), Kingsley Amis points out that sci-fi as a form is bound to depict "human beings not in their relation with one another but with a thing, a monster, an alien, a plague, or a form of society"; in consequence, sci-fi is largely "impersonal" in presentation and tone.

The General
by Alan Sillitoe
(Knopf; $3)

And the first thing we notice about *The General* is its abstractness, its tautness of design, its impersonality, its highly professional cast – perfectly in contrast to all the sense of rage, pent-up insight, and plain mean desperation which happily affect the mood and syntax of the author's earlier *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning*.

The story takes place in that war-torn netherworld of the future which seems to be the only sort of future (near or far) which sci-fi ever imagines. The first character we meet, Evart, is at once identifiable as the good guy of all pop culture; strong and silent, shadowy and unobtrusive and a bit moony, drinking his coffee. Having met him so often before, the reader is prepared to take his general soundness, or hipness, on trust. His opponent is a short portly authority with slightly pimpled features who goes nameless except for his title, The General. This General is a leader in the armies of the Gorsheks (the unlovely, ominously awkward, and juvenile nomenclature is typically sci-fi). The Gorsheks themselves are also native to the form: glazed of eye, psychically numb, incapable of any act except that which is on an agenda, oppressed by the very landscape through which they mechanically drift: "... eyes that gave the impression of peace and gentleness, but eyes that had drawn a living from the sort of landscape imprinted on them, and were therefore alien to peace and gentleness." In science fiction, the Opposition always is made to look like this.

Evart's side supposes it has a slight edge in "humanity" over the other side because it accords, at least, a prestige value to Cultural Activities; whereas the General's side is so washed out as to be below the reach of this pathetic view. Yet when Evart and the orchestra in his charge are taken prisoner by the Gorsheks while en route to play at a front-line concert, the General's poise is unsettled by his sudden fancy to hear music.

When the prisoners learn of this, they take heart and begin to hope for their lives. "Hope" becomes the key word of their discussions (as it will be the theme of the symphony they later play); the word also becomes a nagging ingredient in the General's mind, complicating things, for his orders are to execute the players at once, according to standard operating procedures; any culprit who dares buck the high command, loses the system's support, and is, in Gorshek language, "levelled."

A standard situation in sci-fi, one which its leading practitioners, like Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. or Isaac Asimov, never fail to develop, is the ordeal of the robotized man who must shake free of his antennae to a painfully self-reliant humanhood. In a manner far less wheedling or inflated than that of these makers of potboiler, Mr. Sillitoe works this standard as he describes his general's awakening to independence:

> "... If the High Command said the orchestra were to be killed then there was nothing else he could do but see that they were killed. He must not permit shallow and sentimental feelings to interfere with duty, must stifle regret, stop hope reaching him, and dismiss anger as futile and childish."

The orchestra decides on the surprisingly obvious choice of Tchaikovsky's "Pathétique" Symphony. Unsettled even more by the music, the General is moved, at last, to act on his own. True to form, the story then turns toward the usual "surprise ending" which leaves both Evart and the General sadder but wiser.

It also leaves them as caricatures, neither believable individuals nor symbolic figures in a parable. Questions of art and inhumanity demand a much more qualified and complex working out than what is ventured here. (One thinks, inevitably, of how E. M. Forster treated similar questions in *Howards End* without putting too fine a point on them.) Surely, the popular game of Who's More Human – You or I? We or They?, is as dubious as the notion that art saves.

Not that I would join those drearier British pundits who have been urging Sillitoe back to the old stand (as their counterparts here will be), for more sagas about that Nottingham terrain which he "truly knows, loves, and understands." On the contrary, it is good to see this excellent writer beginning to temper experience with ideas, as he stakes out new points on the map.

Karl Jaspers
The Future of Mankind

HANS J. MORGENTHAU has said of this book: "This is indeed a work of major importance. It is, as far as I know, the only systematic attempt to integrate the fact of atomic power into a philosophic system, providing an over-all view of the human condition, and to draw radical philosophic, moral and political conclusions from that fact. This is indeed a formidable undertaking, and the achievement is most impressive." $6.95

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The Art of Rhetorical Camouflage

by Charles Burton Marshall

A play of ideas between two bodies of thought and experience is implicit in the title of F. S. C. Northrop's latest book. The implication is misleading. Philosophical anthropology gets the jump invariably, runs rings around the adversary, and angles shots into the basket from all over the floor. Practical politics scarcely lays a hand on the ball. The final score is about 100 to zero. Northrop referees, leads cheers, and stars in all positions with his own special razzledazzle. He tries for distance in almost every sentence. He inclines to scorn easy words when he can find difficult ones instead. Who can match him in concealing a predicate or spreading a definition when he really tries? Consider, for example, this: "Stated as briefly as possible, *a 'nation' is any group of concrete, particular human beings who possess in the hierarchically ordered neural nets of their brains a similar set of elementary trapped impulses* (which are the physiological epistemic correlates of consciously or unconsciously memorized elementary ideas and postulates) *for firing or inhibiting their motor neurons and thereby mechanically causing a similar cognitive behavioristic living law response to any given stimulus.*"

Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics
by F. S. C. Northrop
(Macmillan; $6.50)

Northrop appeals for the importance of attaining – and of putting into practice in our policies – better knowledge about the workings of minds and the character of habits in other cultures. He inveighs against a wide tendency to regard other peoples as being Americans with beards. Taken one by one, many of his ideas abound with good sense. He is not one of the solicitous sort likely to accept at face value the declaratory aspirations of the emerging nations. He has a sharp ear for Asian talk of selecting and combining preferred elements of democracy and supposed strong points of a communistic order without real understanding of either. He bears down on the aspiration among the emerging states simultaneously to enjoy the advantages of Western ways and to remain anti-Western. He is alert to the easy folly of assuming foreign aid to be invariably a boon to recipients. He gives sound counsel regarding the deep basis of neutralism among the new states of Asia – "a conception of social leadership and moral conduct as peacemaking without particular regard to specific facts or determinate principles."

Point by point, it all makes sobering reading for the revolution of rising expectations in Washington. I should construe from it a conclusion of hard going for us in world affairs for as far ahead as realistic imagination can reach. Northrop ends up with a quite different notion – "a peace under effective international law . . . practically possible today." There is a proviso to this – the giving of full heed to the factors of living law among the diverse cultures.

This is where philosophical anthropology comes in. A determinative role for its practitioners will settle things: Just let them call the shots. A claim of special efficacy for some one profession or lore is no novelty. Physical scientists, economists, lawyers, theologians, and several other professional groups passingly have their claimants to knowing the real answer to the problems of peace and order. Each such group probably has something to contribute in the large problems, but the tendency is toward overstatement of the case – the claim of having *the* answer. Northrop, I suspect, overstates the case for that body of learning concerned with the character of thought among diverse cultures. In the sweep of his notions, many problems of real concern in foreign policy simply disappear. To dismiss a problem of actual moment as one unworthy to exist in a more sensibly ordered world is scarcely an answer to it.

He bangs away at some favorite targets. People who take strategic questions seriously and believers in doctrines of positive law get their lumps – tediously. Anyone he disapproves of – Christian Herter or Paul Nitze, for example – he is likely to identify as a lawyer without bothering to check *Who's Who*. He sometimes misspells names and misstates titles and does such things as attributing to Washington, Jefferson's phrase "entangling alliances." An editor to do something about his entangling syntax, to correct small errors, to trim the jargon, and to put in proportion his many useful ideas would have been a big help.

Meeting Racism-in-Reverse

by William Chapman

An American Negro anxious to test for himself the wind of change in Africa, Louis Lomax became a sympathetic yet disturbed observer during his journey from Cairo to Johannesburg. Sympathetic because he could feel and share the frustrations of the Africans as a people caught up in turmoil; disturbed because his own ideal of multi-racialism, forged in the American Negro's struggles for integration, is repudiated by so many African leaders who propose to end that turmoil. It was his encounter with nationalist politicians who either reject or suspect the concept of racial partnership that finally left him a "reluctant African."

The Reluctant African
by Louis E. Lomax
(Harper; $2.95)

Mr. Lomax is an experienced journalist, a veteran of such crises as Little Rock, Clinton, Tennessee, and the Emmett Till case. His African report is thin, sketchy and entirely personal. But his vivid portraits make a story well worth the telling.

The reporter's introduction to the racism-in-reverse that he distrusts came in London where he interviewed

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

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a South African writer-politician living in exile. "We will govern unless they kill us," vows William Modisane. "Either way, at long last the Bantu's soul will be at rest." White liberals cannot help in the struggle. "Once the change is complete we can say to all, 'Come live as one with us. And in the heat of the noonday sun, let us sit down – together'."

It was an argument Mr. Lomax heard many times. "They really believe they can whip their mass followers to a make a U-turn and establish a state frenzy against the white man, then where all races can live together in harmony.... I don't believe it...."

In Kenya, the dynamic Tom Mboya, a moderate among African nationalists, was telling much the same story from the political stump. If the Europeans want to remain after independence day, warned the leader of the Kenya African National Union, they will have to forego politics. "We are going to have an all-black Parliament and an all-black government. We are going to divide the land among our peoples. They will come when we say come and go when we say go."

Mr. Lomax discovered in Egypt a vast training camp for black nationalism. Cairo is the magnet for freedom fighters exiled from every non-independent land on the continent. President Nasser welcomes them royally because among them are the future rulers of free nations. A young nationalist who has been housed and fed, even lionized, during his years as an alien will know where to turn when his great day has come. Nasser has recognized the opportunity and has seized on it with the most blatant "black solidarity" propaganda in all Africa. "The freedom fighters admire Nasser even if they do not trust him," Mr. Lomax learned. "They think Nasser's stance as a black African is a bit strained, yet they cannot deny that, in a very real sense, the Egyptian people have come to feel one with the Africans."

If the author was unable to reconcile African politics with his own dedication to American-styled integration, he was not oblivious to the sources of the difference. He has a quick eye and ear for the sort of indignities which have produced the extremist African. It is not surprising that Mr. Lomax, with his strong commitment to racial partnership, arrived at his bleak conclusion: "What one sees in Africa is change, not progress; betterment for the black man, but disappointment for the humanist." His hope lies in a more positive opposition to racism in any form on the part of Western nations and in an enlarged sense of responsibility for the African peoples by the UN.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

T. J. Ross *is on the English faculty of Fairleigh Dickinson University.* Charles Burton Marshall *is the author of* The Limits of Foreign Policy. William Chapman *is a reporter for* The Washington Post.

ART

The Ordeal of Mark Rothko

The Museum of Modern Art continues its relentless exposé of Abstract Expressionism. The process is beginning to resemble beating a dead horse, particularly since the Museum is making a more positive contribution in its announced big exhibition for 1962 on The Human Figure. Still, you have to clear the dead-wood off the alleys and this the Museum has been doing with admirable ruthlessness for a couple of years now. It exploded the fake genealogy of the movement with an important show of Claude Monet, proving beyond doubt that Monet, with or without eye trouble, was to the end not the first Abstract Expressionist but the last flower painter. In a brilliant essay on art theory, the Museum staged an exhibition of abstract photography, proving the movement to be obsolete, since what the camera can do is *retardataire* for the painter to persist in. Then there have been exhibitions of young "talent," both in the Museum proper and in the penthouse lunchroom, showing what happens to self-expression when it's practiced by artists too young to have a self and too uninstructed to know the means of expression.

The latest target in the Museum's continuing assault is one of the authentic half-dozen-or-so leaders of Abstract Expressionism, Mark Rothko. Having undermined the theory and completely destroyed the unusually large contingent of camp-followers, the Museum now moves in on the main force itself. It's too bad, in a way, because most of the true originals in the movement really did – and really still do – have something to add to our visual experience. The actual paintings are by no means as idiotic as they appear in the psalms of praise published by *Art News*. The psalms themselves apparently had a lot to do with the retarded development of the movement. The Museum, at any rate, clearly thinks so; for the more than fifty Rothko paintings, which will be on view through March 12, Peter Selz, curator in charge of the exhibition, has written a biting and funny burlesque of the best psalmic manner. It's all beautifully deadpan; there isn't an overt hint that either Selz or the Museum is aware that they're chopping up Rothko, and with him most of the movement, and throwing them out into the slushy snow on 53rd Street.

The tactic of the show is simplicity itself. It brings together a large number of Rothko's works, any one of which might or might not have some attraction by itself. Together they're absurd. The Museum has been kinder in its exhibitions of truly mass-produced objects. These are customarily exhibited one example at a time.

Not so Rothko. He paints king-sized canvases, consisting usually, of two rectangles, one above the other, with rather misty edges, in different colors, floating on a ground of still a third color. Occasionally there is a strip of even a fourth color between the two main rectangles. When he first took his place in the pantheon, Rothko's rectangles were bright and cheerful, with red, yellow, orange and green

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proclaiming that God's in His Heaven, all's well with the world. Sobered by success, Rothko has lately been turning them out in muddy tones, ever approaching some hidden absolute of black-brown yet resolutely avoiding any equivalent of the wit and precision that Ad Reinhardt manages to include in every version of his own deep purple dark night. The real constant in Rothko's progress is size. The paintings get bigger and bigger, like an inflating balloon. Similarly, in the work and in its worship, the surface gets thinner and thinner, the content gets purer and purer hot air.

Anyone at all given to introspection could sit before one Rothko, particularly those of a few years back, and amuse himself for an idle five minutes watching the rectangles hover. In room after room of painting after painting, the whole idea becomes silly. As the father of five, I say with quiet pride, one of my chief educational problems has been teaching the children to shut up or to change the subject once they get a laugh. Until they're seven or eight, this is completely beyond them. They stand there, eyes sparkling, mindlessly repeating the same story or the same tag line that worked so well and deeply puzzled as the response gets feebler and feebler. Well, you can put up with this in the privacy of your own home, but after all Rothko is getting on for 60. If he doesn't pull out soon, the wallpaper people will get him, same as the linoleum men got Mondrian.

That's one trouble with Rothko. In his psalmic parody, Peter Selz unerringly puts the finger on another. "These silent paintings," he writes, "with their enormous, beautiful, opaque surfaces, are mirrors, reflecting what the viewer brings with him. In this sense, they can even be said to deal directly with human emotions, desires, relationships, for they are mirrors of our fantasy and serve as echoes of our experience."

This is great fun, with its implication, made more specific a little later on, that the ultimate Rothko painting will hang from the penthouse terrace to the dirty snow of 53rd Street and consist of ineffably blank canvas. Yet, as in all good literary burlesque, there is a grain of serious criticism. Selz here reveals himself as an Aristotelian. Aristotle's notion of art as imitation, he accepts as sound, imitation consisting of a likeliness and a difference in relation to the thing imitated, Nature. The trouble with Rothko is that he has eliminated the difference. His paintings present themselves to "our fantasy" exactly as nature does. Like nature, they are the mere ground for our own aesthetic activity, the mere materials for a do-it-yourself intellectual experience. The woods on a snowy evening would do as well, or a fire in the lectern. There was a good deal of piety in my own early education and it seems to me that all the poets I encountered were forever picking up a rock or a rose and musing their way to God. This may well be the proper function of a rock or a rose, but surely of a painting we may expect more.

What the Museum's Rothko show reveals is not that the emperor doesn't have any clothes, but that there isn't any emperor behind that enormous brocade.

FRANK GETLEIN

Correspondence

Concerns of the Navy

Sirs:

I have read *The New Republic* for nearly 35 years and have been a subscriber for perhaps half that long. It would be an understatement to say that I enjoy and value your magazine; it is one of the indispensable means of keeping well informed. The reporting of TRB receives in my home the same keen welcome that I used to associate in my childhood with the arrival of St. Nicholas (the magazine, of course).

In all these years I have been able to resist writing to the editor but your January 16 issue contains two minor errors. On page 3 you have 1,000 Marines embarked in the aircraft carriers Essex and Bennington (Marines are carried in amphibious ships) and on page 11 military retirement pay is listed as income-tax exempt. Certainly these are not mistakes of any real national importance but they relate to matters of great importance to career Navy men. The first is the readiness posture of

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the nation's first line of defense against limited war, the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. While aircraft carriers are the major weapons of these fleets, amphibious units with Marines embarked are also deployed at sea and ready for instant action. It was the amphibious unit of the Sixth Fleet that was ashore in Lebanon within hours of the initial alarm in 1958. During the Laos crisis it was hardly necessary to announce that the Navy was alert and in the area; it should have been a matter of concern to all citizens if this were not the case.

The second error concerning military retirement pay is also unimportant in itself but touches upon a matter of critical importance to the Navy today – the relative attractiveness of a military career.

The Navy, and to a somewhat lesser degree the other services, is having great difficulty in retaining for a career the able young men it needs to man the Fleet. Retirement benefits, not tax-exempt unless a man is retired with a physical disability (and then only partially unless the disability is total) are an important career inducement.

J. V. Noel, Jr.
Captain, US Navy
Washington, D. C.

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Defending the Attorney General

Sirs:

What Alexander Bickel (January 9) calls "hectoring and bullying" by Robert Kennedy was merely the thorough perseverance of one charged with the responsibility of carrying on a highly specialized governmental activity having rules of its own, namely, acting as chief counsel for a Congressional investigating committee in a field surcharged with political dynamite. The treatment of a witness at a Senatorial investigation operates under different rules than govern the conduct of the office of Attorney General. True, both operate under the Constitution and statutes, and both are checked by the imponderable pinprick of conscience and fair play. But no one knows better than Professor Bickel that what is not evidence in a courtroom can be evidence before a Congressional investigating committee. . . . Robert F. Kennedy, despite his years has gained experience and has qualities which give promise of his making an outstanding Attorney General. *Samuel I. Barchas*
Hereford, Arizona

Future Payments Cancelled

Sirs:

Regarding Professor Jenkinson's Family Shelter Fallout Model (December 26) financed with $25 monthly payments, you note "that this is the only product on the market that releases one from all obligations for payment once the product is used."

If your health is at least fair – I can probably arrange for you to buy a sizeable insurance estate on the installment plan with all future payments cancelled when you use the product!

James E. Amick
Blue Springs, Mo.

Tax Reform

Sirs:

The New Republic of January 16, 1961, carried a magnificent article by Matthew J. Kust on Tax Reform. I believe this article is a landmark, that will be consulted by many in future months and future years. *Albert L. Allen*
Boston, Mass.

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

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